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ABSTRACT 
My thesis derives its impetus and its structure from the work and thought of 
Gregory Bateson. My aim is to demonstrate the ongoing vitality of his ecology of Mind 
by tracing the connections between his work and that of Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, 
and Alain Badiou. 
Part I represents a broad overview of Bateson's major works, emphasizing his 
theories of abduction and recursivity as critical philosophical concepts. Bateson's notion 
of abduction as a third investigatory methodology suggests a means for connecting his 
work to that of other theorists. A pioneer of cybernetics, his probing of the recursive role 
of information feedback and of the pragmatic interface between organisms and their 
environment can be read as a meta-model for a multiperspectival approach to 
environmental issues and texts. 
Part II explores the differences and the reiterative similarities in the work of 
Bateson, the French writing team of Felix Guattari and Gilles Deleuze, and contemporary 
French philosopher Alain Badiou. Using mathematical notation as metaphoric semiotics, 
I argue that a theoretical multiplicity moves rhizomatically between and across the very 
permeable boundaries that may be drawn between these theorists, and that the emerging 
connections describe a pregnant holism. 
Part III moves to employ the insights of this theoretical analysis in a more 
pragmatic application of these shared insights and concerns. In a recent journal article, 
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Dr. Robert Cox urged the environmental communication community to define itself as a 
crisis discipline. Bateson's vision for ecological holism was predicated on respecting the 
dangers inherent in ad hoc intervention in systems whose interconnectivity may be little 
perceived when defined in causal and linear terms. The dangers of rhetorically limiting 
the semantics of environmental communication to a heuristic rather than a holistic 
approach are further explored using the work of Deleuze, Guattari and Badiou. This 
section provides a discursive and diacritical response to Dr. Cox's proposals. 
My thesis concludes with the recognition of the depth of Gregory Bateson's 
vision and of the contemporaneity still vibrant in his perspectives. Bateson is in many 
ways the exemplar of an environmental humanities scholar, and I weave that thread into 
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INTRODUCTION: OLD MYSTERIES, NEW CHALLENGES 
In the introduction to what was to have been her father's final book, Angels Fear: 
Towards an Epistemology of the Sacred, editor Mary Catherine Bateson includes a 
section from Gregory Bateson's notes for the text subtitled Defining the Task. There he 
proposes to "begin the task of making the new challenges perceptible to the reader and 
perhaps to give some definition to the new problems" which he saw as emerging in the 
postatomic age (Angels Fear 14). My own task is much the same; I intend not to 
rehabilitate Gregory Bateson's thought so much as to extend it, to pursue its cybernetic 
connections and abstractive leaps into the texts of other thinkers whose efforts either 
explicitly or implicitly resonate with his. I find in Bateson's thought a renewable 
resource, an alternative perspective best described not as some quantity of sedimented 
theory which remains to be extracted, but rather as a circulating energy, a perspective that 
reinvents and reinvests itself as it is re-encountered and re-engaged. My work is intended 
as neither definition nor as description, but as a beginning-again, a reverberation 
grounded in an interface that, like a rhizome, has neither beginning nor end but rather 
arises in the middle of a cybernetic interface between Gregory Bateson AND Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari AND Alain Badiou. 
Bateson did much to provide a vital and vibrant argument regarding man's 
relationship with his environment, with his fellow men, and with his inner self. In his 
foreward to Bateson's third book, Mind and Nature. Sergio Manghi writes: 
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The "ecological" language created by Bateson, in particular 
starting in the 1960s, has to be considered one of the most 
important attempts of the 20 t h century to rethink the human 
condition in the planetary era. It was, in other words, an attempt to 
explore in depth our being part of larger systems—interpersonal, 
social, and natural—engaged in an impetuous unification of 
humanity and a growing mystical faith in technology's power of 
salvation." (x) 
That Bateson's work was well-received at the time it was published is evident from the 
number of his contemporaries, particularly environmental writers, who seized upon his 
notions of holistic systems and connective patterns of behavior and referenced them in 
their work. Yet surprisingly, his work is little read today, and then rarely applied beyond 
the disciplines with which he is most often identified, whether anthropology, psychology, 
cybernetics, or environmental studies. That his ideas demand to be reconsidered is one of 
his own injunctions to his readers—that those same ideas deserve to be reexamined and 
might usefully and provocatively be reapplied in a multiplicity of circumstances is my 
own argument. 
To that end, my thesis will investigate Gregory Bateson's body of work for 
significant concepts that might extend beyond his own circumstances and which would 
inform a twenty-first century environmental situation. Presented in the same 
organizational framework as his Steps to an Ecology of Mind, Part I will focus on 
Bateson's published and unpublished work and on the foundational concepts which 
circulate throughout his texts. Ranging over an intellectual lifespan of some forty-five 
years, Bateson's essays, interviews, correspondence and published books reveal an 
evolutionary growth in an epistemology that continually renews and critiques itself while 
pursuing both a rigorous and yet creatively imaginative vision that he would ultimately 
call the cybernetic Mind. Moving chronologically and yet reiteratively through his body 
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of work, some key concepts serve to underscore Bateson's interest in patterns and in 
connections, and to that end I focus especially on his notions of abduction and 
recursiveness, allowing their interplay to provide a multiple perspective on each of his 
texts. Double description is another of Bateson's favorite methodologies; recognizing in 
one of his rare poems that "if you read between the lines/You will find nothing there," 
Bateson constantly seeks not things but those relationships that resonate between them as 
the source of meaning and magic in the ecology of mind (Angels Fear 5). That there are 
relationships and repetitions, as well as differences, between and among his essays also 
serves to forward his interest in the ways that immanent mental process suggests a 
unifying potential that can defeat the reification of difference codified in Cartesian 
duality and reinscribed by purposive consciousness. Such immanence cannot be 
embodied within a single human mind or a discretely human being, but must instead be 
metaphorically understood as an extended and dynamic system, which Bateson expresses 
as cybernetic Mind. 
This sets up the movement in Part II towards the intersections of Bateson's ideas 
in cybernetic resonance with those of other writers, particularly the work of Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari as it builds on explicit connections to Bateson's 
epistemology. Using mathematical sign as both a connective and as a figural device, Part 
II probes the manifest connections between Deleuze and Guattari's materialist ontology 
and Bateson's cybernetic epistemology, while also opening up a wider field of inquiry 
through this same device. Deleuze and Guattari's work together, and particularly 
Guattari's solo works, both explicitly and implicitly bear the imprint of Bateson's 
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each. Deleuze and Guattari also move Bateson's thought forward, adapting and mutating 
his thematics into rhizomatic pathways beyond his conceptual structure and producing 
not only revolutionary but co-evolutionary constructions. Their work also serves as a 
bridge between Bateson's thought at his death in the twentieth century to the 
contemporary and more-than-modern work of twenty-first century French philosopher 
Alain Badiou. 
Badiou's work, grounded in mathematical semiotics and concerned with truth and 
with the subjects it induces, provides a fertile ground for making the kinds of abductive 
connections that Bateson advocates. Badiou founds much of his ontology in specific 
situations, an intellectually and spatially appropriate interstice that figures the overlap of 
the materialist concerns of Deleuze and Guattari with the ecological language of Bateson. 
Badiou's philosophy is presented in the language and notation of set theory, which 
acknowledges the early work of Bertrand Russell, so critical to Bateson's early 
epistemology, yet moves beyond it even as set theory has evolved to resolve some of the 
constraints that the earlier incarnation created for Bateson; the resulting connections 
between Bateson AND Deleuze and Guattari AND Badiou provide the step to yet another 
plateau of inquiry. 
In Part III, the founding essay for the newly launched journal, Environmental 
Communication, is deconstructed through the multiple perspectives of Bateson, Deleuze, 
Guattari, and Badiou, in order to demonstrate the vitality and the integrity of their 
respective minds conjoined as one while problematizing the disciplinary and ethical 
vision promulgated by author Robert Cox. Nothing could better illustrate the ongoing 
vibrancy and value of Gregory Bateson's practice and process than to utilize it in a 
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5 
contemporary critique; to test the accuracy of these proposals by recursively feeding them 
back through a Bateson-Deleuze-Guattari-Badiou machine is to productively challenge 
Cox's ideas and to test them for survival in an ecology of mind that is as elegantly alive 
today as it was when Bateson first proposed it in 1971. 
I conclude by considering how this shared vision might also inform a 
multidisciplinary and multivocal program such as the University of Utah's master's 
degree program in Environmental Humanities. Both Bateson and Guattari are concerned 
with integration rather than specialization, and the interplay between their points of view 
informs the kinds of intellectual diversity that an interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary 
program must advocate. Guattari, never at a loss for adapting languages (whether major 
or minor, written or spoken, digital or analogous) to serve his purposes, describes a 
"concrete machine" as that which "traverses different domains.. .capable not of 
integrating but of articulating singularities of the field under consideration to join 
absolutely heterogeneous components" (Chaosophy 40). Bateson would articulate this as 
the cybernetic Mind's ability to locate meaning in noise, the source of all new ideas. For 
Environmental Humanities to survive as an ecology of ideas, that access to the plenitude 
of the void within its situation must be privileged and protected. 
Further than that, as Bateson wrote in his introductory notes for Angels Fear. I do 
not expect to go. My hope is to craft an argument that promotes a further discussion of 
Gregory Bateson's prolific epistemology by recursively examining his ecology of ideas 
and by exposing his concerns to the postmodern critical theorists of our present situation. 
To do so is to embrace my own immersion in that ecology of mind that is BATESON + 
DELEUZE + GUATTARI + BADIOU. 
 t
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PART I: AND YET THE BEAUTIFUL PERSISTS 
Gregory Bateson's first published book appeared in 1936. Naven is an 
anthropological treatise, the result of Bateson's field work among the head-hunting 
Iatmul of New Guinea.1 Classically educated in Great Britain, Bateson began his 
academic career in biology, following in the footsteps of his father, the distinguished 
biologist and genetics advocate William Bateson,2 but soon shifted to the newly-
emerging social science of anthropology, which he hoped would "supply the personal 
inspiration which I believe myself to need, and indeed hope always to need" (Lipset 115). 
It is that same need which would ultimately propel Bateson forward through a changing 
series of disciplinary affiliations; over the course of his professional and academic life, he 
would also find inspiration in the fields of cybernetics and communications theory, 
psychiatric studies, cetacean and mammalian communication, and in the relationships of 
all these fields to individual, social, and natural ecologies. In 1958, a second edition of 
Naven was published which included a second epilogue by Bateson. In his "Preface to 
the Second Edition," Bateson states that this second epilogue was dictated by his need to 
reevaluate his original investigative conclusions in light of the multifaceted constellation 
of knowledge his intellectual journey had exposed. His comment that "we now have the 
beginnings of a general theory of process and change, adaptation and pathology.. .and, in 
terms of the general theory, we have to reexamine all that we thought we knew about 
organisms, societies, families, personal relationships, ecological systems, servo-
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7 
mechanisms, and the like" is an elegant nod to the work which would occupy him for the 
next decade. 
In 1971 's Steps to an Ecology of Mind. Bateson presented a collection of his 
essays and lectures that demonstrated his ongoing reevaluation of his thought in what he 
identified as four main subject areas: "anthropology, psychiatry, biological evolution and 
genetics, and the new epistemology which comes out of systems theory and ecology" 
(Steps "Foreword, 1971" xxii). His ordering mirrors his own interest in Bertrand 
Russell's Theory of Logical Types,3 a philosophical/logical argument that Bateson used 
extensively in his early investigations of sequential orders or degrees of logical 
abstraction in human thought and communication patterns. He divides this book first into 
sections, arranged by thematic or disciplinary homogeneity, in an order that corresponds 
to the sequence in which his disciplinary affiliations progressed. Within each section, the 
essays and lectures are arranged chronologically, from his earliest investigations to those 
most recently considered. Critically, Bateson comments that he expects most readers to 
confine themselves to their own area of interest and that consequently he has not edited 
out repetition across the sections, but it is here that his particular stylistic gift reveals 
itself. It is that repetition which is of utmost consequence to Bateson's critical theory, a 
redundancy that he will more specifically develop into the concepts of abduction and 
recursivity, key elements of his third book, Mind and Nature. 
Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity was first published in 1979. Seriously ill 
with lung cancer, the seventy-five year old Bateson was able to complete this book only 
with the help of his daughter, Mary Catherine Bateson, and its publication barely 
predated his death in July, 1980. In this book, Bateson hoped to forward his new kind of 
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8 
science, the "ecology of mind" he concluded with in Steps, by making explicit the 
implicit linkages he had begun to forge connecting cybernetics and evolution, relating 
information to difference, and conflating mind with nature. In his Introduction to Steps, 
he stated: 
My belief that such matters as the bilateral symmetry of an 
animal, the patterned arrangement of leaves in a plant, the 
escalation of an armaments race, the processes of courtship, 
the nature of play, the grammar of a sentence, the mystery 
of biological evolution, and the contemporary crises in 
man's relationship to his environment, can only be 
understood in terms of such an ecology of ideas as I 
propose." (Steps xxiii) 
In Mind and Nature, Bateson prefaces his reexamination of that belief with a question to 
be answered, one on which hangs the major premises of this book. Asking, "What is the 
pattern which connects all the living creatures," Bateson proposes that an aesthetic of 
connection, of pattern, of relationship is the defining metaphor for a cybernetic mind 
which exceeds the outlines and boundaries of Cartesian logic (Mind and Nature 7). His 
intention in this book is to find those connections that will render differences between 
biological theory and cybernetic theory permeable and penetrable, to examine how 
"differences though static in the outside world can generate events if you move in relation 
to them" (Mind and Nature 199). "So What?", his concluding metalogue (a literary 
device he employs to great effect, advancing his theories by means of a hypothetical 
dialogue between "father" and "daughter"), outlines what would become his final project. 
Published in 1987, seven years after Gregory Bateson's death, Angels Fear: 
Towards an Epistemology of the Sacred, was edited by Mary Catherine Bateson from her 
father's manuscripts, notes, and correspondences. As the ending chapter in Mind and 
Nature suggested, Gregory Bateson's final project was to have been an exploration of the 
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9 
question, "Onto what sort of surface shall 'aesthetics' and 'consciousness' be mapped?" 
(Mind and Nature 198). This mapping was to have provided the next "step" in his 
ecology of mind, an interrogation of the beautiful and the conscious, and an attempt to 
address a third term, the sacred. By her own admission, his daughter found the task of 
attempting to complete her father's unfinished questions a daunting one; in her 
introductory remarks, she calls the published book a "testament, but one that passes on a 
task not to me only but to all those prepared to wrestle with such questions" (Angels Fear 
2). To aid in the furtherance of that task, Ms. Bateson notes that her father's original, 
unedited manuscripts and notebooks will remain in the archives of the University of 
California, Santa Cruz, where future scholars might re-visit them, for yet another round 
of reevaluation and reinterrogation. 
The final metalogue, authored by Mary Catherine Bateson and appropriately titled 
"Persistent Shade," reiterates Bateson's own wish for his legacy. At the conclusion of the 
Nineteenth Annual Korzybski Memorial Lecture, which Gregory Bateson delivered in 
January of 1970, he emphasized his belief that mind is immanent not only within the 
minor structure we know as the human brain but also along the continuum of an infinitely 
greater external trajectory, one not defined by physical limitations or by such conceptual 
outlines as life or death. He concluded his lecture by stating, "The ideas which seemed to 
be me can also become immanent in you. May they survive—if true" (Steps 471). In his 
daughter's final chapter of his less-than-final book, Bateson's persistent shade wryly 
points out that "such immortality as we have is in our ideas" (Angels Fear 201). 
Certainly, in Bateson's case, his legacy continues in the work not only of his colleagues 
and students, but also in the works that have evolved from his, that extend and broaden 
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his own ecology of mind whether explicitly acknowledged or not.4 The patterns that 
connect them, the connections which betoken those patterns, ripple across disciplines and 
flow through texts and time. Bateson's theories and theories of theories, the patterns and 
meta-patterns that informed his evolving epistemology, far exceed the brief canon of his 
published thought. Critical to the pursuit of his immanent imprint is a closer look at his 
theories of abduction and recursiveness, and at how the evolution and revision of those 
theories circulate within any effort to trace the ongoing manifestation of Bateson's 
ecology of mind in its contemporary and futural contexts. 
Abduction 
In "The Science of Mind and Order," the introduction to Steps to an Ecology of 
Mind. Bateson stresses his belief that the early nineteenth and twentieth century scientific 
emphasis on matter, on substance, has occluded a more vital and productive exploration 
of form as the organizing principle that connects all living things. By leading the reader 
to follow his own spiraling progression from observed physical phenomena to observed 
relational phenomena, Bateson deftly underscores his own growing recognition of cross-
disciplinary evidence that suggests the primacy of form as a meta-message circulating 
throughout the ecology of mind. It is this recognition of form through connective 
patterning that he will come to define as an alternative epistemological methodology—he 
will espouse not induction or deduction but abduction. In a pivotal series of Comments 
which follow each of his thematic sections in Steps, he unpacks the connections which 
might elude the impatient reader, one who receives the message signal (in Bateson's 
rephrasing of Russell, "Zero learning") and who comprehends it ("Learning I"), but who 
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11 
fails to make the necessary movement beyond that initial frame of reference to learning-
about-learning, to a reflexive frame of consideration that incorporates what-is-learned 
while considering what contexts that specific learning delimits (Bateson called this type 
of learning-to-learn "deutero-learning" or "Learning II"). By reintroducing the 
knowledge stream that he has developed sequentially through the included essays and 
lectures, and by then considering the epistemology of that epistemology, the description 
of that description, Bateson also subtly assists his reader to participate in the recursive 
process that is immanent within the ecology of Mind. 
Bateson concludes Part II: Form and Pattern in Anthropology by calling for a 
new interpretation of interdisciplinarity—one that will not simply reframe information in 
the discursive code of one discipline or another, one that will not simply offer a lateral 
move to a reclassification or renaming of things, but one that demands an identification 
of relationships however they are described (Steps 153). He illustrates his argument by 
proposing an analogy between the formal structure of a flowering plant and that of a 
sentence, and wonders at the potential significance of pursing an analogy between two 
seemingly disparate examples, one rooted in the natural sciences, one so manifestly a 
signifier of cultural production. He is suggesting not an inductive move constructing 
theory from data, not a deductive lineage that dissects data from theory, but rather an 
abstract leap to the recognition of an analogous relationship (critically, that relationship is 
already-immanent; it is not the triumphant and transcendent imposition of a connection 
by an external and omnipotent mind). One system of relationship that is housed in 
Nature.. .one that is immanently situated in Mind. He goes on to propose a radical 
addition to evolutionary science, the concept of co-evolution of species and environment. 
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Bateson writes, "It is the context which evolves," a statement of such breathtaking 
simplicity and yet of such implicative enormity that it fundamentally reorders Darwinian 
thought (Steps 155). It is not the relata, the data, the content of our descriptive notation 
that should be the focal point of this new interdisciplinary science, but rather the 
relationship between the message and the context, the ecology of the situation into which 
the message is delivered (and, as he later emphasized, the context out of which the 
message is coming), which must be considered in any discussion of any evolution (and 
by abduction, by any discussion of any system or set of contexts). 
By the conclusion of Part III: Form and Pathology in Relationship, Bateson has 
extended the results of his studies of psychology, family relationships, and pathologies of 
communication to his original anthropological observations. Still concerned with form 
and analogy as meta-communicative devices, his use of logical types has led him to map 
the communicative pathologies in schizophrenia and alcoholism onto his observations 
about co-evolution and the relationships immanent in and transgressive of contextual 
territories. In a series of related essays, Bateson explores the communicative dysfunction 
that schizophrenics commonly exhibit, a pathology he compares to an inability to 
distinguish between logical types or frames of reference, the tendency towards the use of 
"unlabeled metaphors"(Steps 205). Bateson observes that schizophrenic speech patterns 
are adaptations born of context; that certain family relationships become so toxic for an 
individual member that he/she resorts to this metaphoric speech as a protective response, 
one that is simultaneously adaptive and pathological. He concludes this section by noting 
that such a response is illustrative of the incompatibility of the logic of adaptation and the 
logic of survival: what is at once a successful adaptation in the individual can have 
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destructive and devastating consequences for the survival of the system as a whole (Steps 
339). For Bateson, this suggests that these ideas about schizophrenia, the double bind, 
and pathology are concepts which "cease to be matters of individual psychology and 
become part of the ecology of ideas in systems or 'minds' whose boundaries no longer 
coincide with the skins of the participant individuals" (Steps 339). 
The next two sections of Steps to an Ecology of Mind represent the systematic 
and cybernetic dialectic between old and new information, reinforming and recycling 
disparate disciplinary concerns to produce newly analogous observations. Part IV: 
Biology and Evolution, returns Bateson to the anti-Darwin arguments of his father, while 
Part V: Epistemology and Ecology moves him forward to his more recent forays into 
cybernetics and the environmental arguments that would characterize his later works. In 
both, his concluding comments focus on his growing conviction that a new science must 
provide a conceptual bridge between his observations on the flow of information in the 
human world with his analogous and yet seemingly contradictory observations about 
flows of information within nonhuman organisms and between them and their 
environments. There is a sense of his growing concern about the impacts of technology 
on the health of the ecology, and a reiteration of his sense that purposive human 
intervention can become pathological in natural systems. In the concluding section of 
Steps to an Ecology of Mind, Part VI: Crisis in the Ecology of Mind, Bateson offers a 
series of thematically linked lectures without an ostensible conclusion or his customary 
Comments section. The "crisis" he describes is one that he believes "arises out of errors 
in our habits of thought at deep and partly unconscious levels" (Steps 495). It is a crisis 
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As Peter Harries-Jones observes in his excellent survey of Bateson's thought, 
Recursive Vision: Ecological Understanding and Gregory Bateson, Bateson began to find 
the language of logical types too limiting to enunciate his attempts to map the 
connections between natural systems and human systems of communications, a challenge 
reflected in his intellectual movement from the structuralist thematics of Steps to the 
more organic emphasis in Mind and Nature (Harries-Jones 168). Conflating the 
evolutionary mechanism of genetic change with the cybernetic phenomenon of learning 
by assuming that each is a stochastic process (a process that combines both a random 
component with a nonrandom selection process), Bateson stresses the necessity for 
replacing Cartesian duality with a unified philosophy of nature and mind that he intimates 
in his subtitle through the clarification of two key thematics, abduction and recursion. 
While he utilized both in his stylistic and his intellectual methodology in Steps, it is only 
in his third book that he explicitly names them. 
Rather than simply imposing connective patterns across the Mind/Nature dualism 
through the traditional logistics of inductive or deductive reasoning, Bateson proposes 
instead the use of another methodology: abduction,5 the "lateral extension of abstract 
components of description" (Mind and Nature 133). As a means of recognizing and 
articulating relationships without respect to formal boundaries or limitations, abduction is 
both transgressive and descriptive; it represents both a leap of abstraction and an 
acknowledgement of an immanent and a priori analogy, the recognition of a relationship 
rather than the creation of one. It is evidenced in an array of examples that Bateson lists, 
including "metaphor, dream, parable, allegory, the whole of art, the whole of science, the 
whole of religion, [and] the whole of poetry," and it lends itself to another concept that 
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Bateson demands in the communicative framework of both natural and human systems, 
the process he terms "double description" (Mind and Nature 133, 134). Bateson's 
difficulty with using logical theory to ground his new epistemology is its abhorrence of 
paradox; indeed, the theory of logical types was devised specifically to preclude the 
presence of paradox in philosophical thought. The relational context that prompts the 
schizophrenic's adaptive (if ultimately pathological) use of unlabeled metaphor can 
accelerate into the dilemma Bateson named the double bind, a paradoxical situation in 
which an individual finds that a sequence of otherwise appropriate behaviors results in 
such negative consequences that the individual resorts to otherwise inappropriate 
behaviors as a means of resolving the increasingly conflicting circumstances,6 Paradox is 
thus both the source of creativity and innovation in response to contextual flux as well as 
potentially the maelstrom from which pathology may emerge.7 
Paradox is also inescapably present in nature; an explanatory system that abhors a 
paradox cannot sufficiently stand as a discursive rhetoric for a new science that attempts 
to conflate natural systems with human communicative ones. In a fascinating lecture 
delivered in 1980 and published in Donaldson's A Sacred Unity, Bateson details the 
sequence of thought that led him away from logic and towards another solution. In "Men 
are Grass: Metaphor and the World of Mental Process," he suggests that while "logic was 
a most elegant tool for the description of lineal systems of causation... that logic could be 
used for the description of biological pattern and biological event has never been at all 
clear. Indeed, it is rather sharply clear that it is unsuitable, at least in the description of 
such circular causal systems and recursive systems as will generate the paradox" (Sacred 
Unity 239). He proposes instead to apply a form of thought that he epitomizes in the type 
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of syllogism called "affirming the consequent," one that he suggests is more suggestive 
of his own way of thinking and of that of the poets: "metaphor.. .Meta-phor"—a 




Men are grass. 
For Bateson, what is revealed in this poetic abstraction is the very kind of 
epistemological tool needed to think the patterns and connections of the cybernetic 
organism-plus-environment. In this syllogism, the equation that emerges represents a leap 
through process, through the verb-as-predicate, not a lineal progression through subjects 
(as in the filial linkage demonstrated in the more logically acceptable "Men die. Socrates 
is a man. Socrates will die."). In abduction, the isolation of human subjects across the 
Cartesian divide of Mind from Nature is breached by the abstract leap to co-evolution, to 
relational adaptation, to shared ecology. Near the end of this lecture, Bateson suggests 
that "Life, perhaps, doesn't always ask what is logically sound" and that 
abduction/metaphor predates the Socratic logic that would deny it. "Metaphor was not 
just pretty poetry, it was not either good or bad logic, but was in fact the logic upon 
which the biological world had been built, the main characteristic and organizing glue of 
this world of mental process which I have been trying to sketch for you in some way or 
other" (Sacred Unity 241). 
In order to advance his argument for abduction as a necessary conceptual vehicle, 
Bateson must adapt the theory of logical types with an evolutionary epistemology that 
allows for a nonlinear apprehension of relationship, even at the risk of embracing the 
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17 
random as part of this new cybernetic holism. As he notes, "we must pass through the 
threat of that chaos where thought becomes impossible" if we are to preserve the 
flexibility necessary for survival, whether intellectual, communicative, or evolutionary 
(Mind and Nature 134). In 1970, Bateson completed an essay entitled "Ecology and 
Flexibility in Urban Civilization," in which he posited that change manifests itself 
adaptively in two ways. Short-term, somatic alterations provide immediate response to 
environmental stimulus without resulting in the hard-wired, more permanent changes 
evidenced in genetic change. In order to remain highly adaptive, an organism needs to 
avoid the kinds of permanent genetic changes that might limit further adaptability; what 
is definitive of survival is flexibility, a quality Bateson defines as "uncommitted 
potentiality for change" (Steps 505). Within certain contexts or thresholds of tolerance, 
change is simply the ability to move along an available range of responses, the wider the 
range the better, with an oscillating and doubly descriptive movement between the 
organism and its environment as each attempts to reach some new plateau of stability 
(Mind and Nature 134). Flexibility in natural systems demands a reservoir of potentiality 
that must be derived from the random, the not-yet-selected, and the wild diversity 
implicit in a chaos not proscribed by the rational or the logical. Flexibility in 
communication systems must likewise be generated not from the known but from the 
abstract, from that which is not-yet-defmed, and also from that which is not limited by 
the preferences of the logical. In 1967's "Cybernetic Explanation," Bateson wrote 
prophetically that "all that is not information, not redundancy, not form and not 
restraints—is noise, the only possible source of new patterns" (Steps 416). The linear 
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of the new; as difference is itself not a quantifiable thing but rather an idea predicated in 
the terms of a relationship, it requires some other notation to convey it8. Abduction 
provides a lens that informs difference, a perspective that disregards outlines and 
abstracts patterns, where mind and nature defy the dualisms of Cartesian rationality, and 
where the confines of hierarchical logics yield to an unrestrained ecology of ideas, one 
infused and sustained by a recursiveness that is vital to ensuring a necessary flexibility9. 
Recursiveness 
The first appearance of the Bateson term recursiveness appears near the 
conclusion of Mind and Nature. Wrestling here as elsewhere with the restrictions 
imposed on his efforts to find a coherent descriptive context that embraces both the 
logical ecology of mind and the natural ecology of the nonhuman pre-linguistic natural 
world, Bateson muses that "it appears that the idea of 'logical typing,' when transplanted 
from the abstract realms inhabited by mathmaticological philosophers to the hurly-burly 
of organisms, takes on a very different appearance. Instead of a hierarchy of classes, we 
face a hierarchy of orders of recursiveness" (Mind and Nature 188). Recursion refers to 
the repeated application of a rule or procedure to successive results; in The Oxford 
American College Dictionary, this is ironically demonstrated in the definition of 
recursion, "the repeated application of a recursive procedure or definition" (1137). 
Bateson's interest in recursiveness is directly related to his study of feedback and 
feedback mechanisms, a characteristic process implicit in cybernetic systems; however, 
an awareness of this kind of behavioral loop was also present in his early studies of 
culture contact. Bateson was interested in what he called schismogenesis, which he 
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defined as "a process of differentiation in the norms of individual behaviour resulting 
from cumulative interaction between individuals'" (Naven 175). His interest in how the 
cumulative effects of some repeated behavior/process result in the change or 
differentiation of a cultural/systemic form is reaffirmed in much of Part II: Form and 
Pattern in Anthropology in Steps to an Ecology of Mind; his exploration of competitive 
and noncompetitive behaviors and his interrogations of symmetrical versus 
complementary processes in relationships across a variety of cultural divides (gender, 
age, nationality), and his attempts to correlate those responsive changing patterns with the 
notion of biological coevolution of species-and-environments, lead him to an interest in 
the importance of feedback in communication systems. In Mind and Nature, Bateson 
elaborates on the concept of feedback by referencing Horst Mittelstaedt's work, which 
noted that there were two distinct methods or behavior types that describe the process of 
perfecting an adaptive act (Mind and Nature 182). Comparing the differences between 
shooting a rifle and shooting a shotgun, Bateson suggests that while shooting a rifle 
consists of a series of singular acts of self-correction (aim, correct, aim, correct, shoot), 
shooting a shotgun is a more complex process, one where the marksman cannot self-
correct before shooting.1 0 In this type of adaptive act, "there is no possibility of error 
correction in the single act. To achieve any improvement, correction must be performed 
upon a large class of actions" (Mind and Nature 183). In other words, in order to self-
correct, the entire process or class of actions that is shooting the shotgun (raise the gun + 
aim + shoot) must be fed back into the system in order to lead to any kind of self-
correction. Critical to this kind of method, which Mittelstaedt called calibration, is the 
requirement of practice, of the noniterative repetition of that same class of actions, each 
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20 
round or cycle subtly altered by the information/learning initiated by the reconsideration 
of the previous sequence(s) of actions.1 1 For Bateson, this distinction is a revelation: 
simple feedback is much like his earlier concept of Learning I; calibration, like Learning 
II, describes a higher order of learning, a second-order level of feedback, and the two 
may be viewed as a metaphor/abduction for the issues of process and form that he first 
investigated in Naven. In a later essay, he connects this same distinction to 
recursiveness. He observes that Norbert Wiener pioneered the idea of a first-order 
recursiveness or "feedback" in his description of the way causal information in cybernetic 
systems moved in a sequential, circular pathway. Second-order recursiveness, of the kind 
which he attributes to the work of Varela and Maturana,1 2 is of a more complex nature 
(Sacred Unity 220). First-order recursiveness equates to simple feedback in systems, in 
the processes he describes in both natural evolutionary adaptation and in the mental 
activity of learning; second-order recursiveness then can be understood as the higher-
order move to patterns of self-reference, to introversion, and to the embodiment of 
difference that potentially gives rise to the perception of a discrete and atomistic self.13 
As Bradford Keeney straightforwardly translates Bateson's recursiveness into the 
dynamics of family therapy, if one imagines recursiveness as a snake that eats its own 
tail, "[sjpeaking of recursion enables us to point to the same snake, while indicating the 
order of recycling... [There is] a general self-referential paradox underlying all observing 
systems: The observer's observations may include his observing" (32). 
For Gregory Bateson, recursiveness commands not only a theoretical perspective 
that circulates throughout the cybernetic Mind, but also an ethical duty to maintain a 
constant awareness of the whole system, even while considering any part of that system 
 r i ti
t  tions. I I r l ti : 
  
     
  fi
  first- r
    ti  
    
  t rana,12   
  
   
       
    ,  t  
e      lf. 13 
r   r l  '   
 f        
  ] i  f       
      r tial   
 '     
  ,     ti l 
t  t   t  l  i  
t  f     i   t f t  
21 
in detail. He notes the oscillation in his own developing epistemology, a seemingly 
circuitous and repetitive movement between form/tautology/calibration and 
process/feedback, and he suggests that it is his growing awareness of recursiveness in his 
own thinking that has radically altered his knowing. He comments: 
[A]s you become aware that you are doing it, you become 
in a curious way much closer to the world around you. The 
word "objective" becomes, of course, quite quietly 
obsolete; and at the same time the word "subjective," which 
normally confines "you" within your skin, disappears as 
well. It is, I think, the debunking of the objective that is the 
important change. The world is no longer "out there" in 
quite the same way that it used to seem to be. (Afterword 
245). 
The same theme of a mind/nature immanent within an oscillating cybernetic 
system which emerges between the theoretical abstractions of form and process, structure 
and flux, reappears in Angels Fear: Towards an Epistemology of the Sacred. The 
recursiveness that pervades Bateson's thought makes itself felt in the echoing repetitions 
that the reader encounters throughout his texts. Indeed, Bradford Keeney points out in a 
footnote to his introduction to Aesthetics of Change that it is because of his particular 
stylistic choices that Bateson's work is "sometimes regarded as difficult to read" (6). Just 
as the organization of material, the thematic and chronological ordering that Bateson 
imposed on his selections in Steps to an Ecology of Mind, inexorably lead the reader to 
re-encounter ideas newly filtered through the perspectives of disparate disciplines, so 
Bateson also calibrates his reader's appreciation of a particular idea by a kind of enforced 
practice of that idea. In Chapter IV of Angels Fear, "The Model," he returns to his 
examples of calibration and feedback as models of form and process, models from which 
abduction might "draw.. .from phenomena in different fields that which is shared among 
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22 
them" (Angels Fear 37). Here, Bateson is consciously moving towards an interrogation of 
the aesthetic and the sacred, towards an articulation of wholism as necessity. The 
distinction he wants to emphasize here in his comparison of the acts of shooting a rifle 
versus shooting a shotgun concerns the way each models a different kind of error 
correction. He points out that while the rifleman has the opportunity to correct for error 
before he shoots, that correction is aimed at the singular instance of that situation, Each 
action presents a discrete opportunity for success, a unique opportunity where aim can be 
consciously adjusted to bring about the desired result, but that correction ends as that 
single shot is fired. Shooting a shotgun, on the other hand, offers no opportunity for 
purposive correction prior to the act of firing; practice, repetition, the calibration of 
muscle memory and timing, all result from the process of an error correction that can 
occur only after the shot and that will inform all future efforts, recursively becoming a 
part of the very system it seeks to correct. Drawing from this example, Bateson describes 
his own efforts to learn to play the violin as a child, an infelicitous exercise that he 
approached as though wielding a rifle rather than a shotgun. "I tried very hard, when 
playing, to play right" he notes. "I attempted to use error correction in the single action 
of each note. The result was unmusical" (Angels Fear 45). The lesson here is in the 
interface between levels or hierarchies of orders of recursiveness, in the difference 
between conscious aim and an unconscious habit learned through practice, in a shift of 
focus from the part to the whole, from the singular to the sequential. Bateson is again 
using abduction as a means of making visible the repetitions/patterns/redundancies which 
move across thematic or disciplinary boundaries, causing them to seem less divisive and 
more descriptive. His argument in Angels Fear is simply that "when we focus too 
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23 
narrowly upon the parts, we fail to see the necessary characteristics of the whole" 
(Angels Fear 52). 
Recursiveness and abduction create bridges to a greater wholeness, a monism that 
is its own holism. Denying the existence of or need for a transcendent supernatural being 
and equally distrustful of an egocentric and triumphant humanism, Bateson is more 
concerned with enunciating the potentiality immanent in cybernetic Mind as a metaphor 
for that dynamic and dangerous holism. In the 1964 essay, "The Logical Categories of 
Learning and Communication," Bateson expanded his discussion of the orders of learning 
to speculate on Learning III, an outward progression in mental process beyond the 
recursive self-referentiality of Learning II towards a profound reorganization in which 
"[the] 'self will take on a sort of irrelevance. The concept of 'self will no longer 
function as a nodal argument in the punctuation of experience" (Steps 304). The 
descriptive differences that are necessary to maintain the outlines that delineate contexts 
and define selves are subsumed in "the resolution of contraries [which] reveals a world in 
which personal identity merges into all the processes of relationship in some vast ecology 
or aesthetics of cosmic interaction" (Steps 306). Included in those contraries which 
Bateson hopes to see resolved is the Cartesian separation of man from nature, a resolution 
which intimates a necessary unity that ultimately leads to the aesthetic wholism that 
Bateson will identify as the sacred. That the movement towards such an un-limited order 
of becoming can be both dangerous and creative is clear; to achieve Learning III would 
require a mental leap into the plenitude of the void, into the dynamic and unstable space 
that is the interface between the conscious and the unconscious. In a revealing interview 
from 1979, Bateson warns that "we have lost a wholeness of being which would include 
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'that' and the 'other' side together.. .1 think the sacramental is being damaged all the 
time. The damage is the taking apart. The sacredness is the coming together" (Sacred 
Unity 301-303). 
Abduction is a tool that fosters the recovery of the sacred by encouraging the re­
cognition of those patterns which connect. It is a methodology Bateson most frequently 
identified with art and poetry, tools that "are discoveries in the literal etymological sense 
of the word. They are uncoveries of that which one knew before. Then sacredness has 
something to do with this covering and uncovering deeper components" (Sacred Unity 
303, emphasis added). Recursiveness contributes to that burying of ideas, to the 
submersion of ideas in the unconscious mind, the repository of habit. Implicit in 
Bateson's understanding of the difference between the conscious and the unconscious 
mind is his assertion that Freud's theories err in placing too much emphasis on the 
conscious mind as primary and the unconscious mind as secondary; Bateson reverses the 
emphasis, insisting that the conscious mind is a limited field of mysterious yet 
mechanical activity, while the processes of the unconscious are "continually active, 
necessary, and all-embracing" (Steps 135-136). For Bateson, the arts (and here he means 
painting, poetry, music, dance—those non-Procrustean forms of communication that are 
in themselves metaphoric and analogous rather than linguistically specific) potentially 
serve as a bridge between the conscious and the unconscious, a way of communicating 
externally that which dwells inwardly, the manifestation of the "outward and visible sign 
of an inward and spiritual grace" (Steps 35). The significance of this is that art is 
abductive; it affords us the opportunity to enter into the relationships it expresses, to fully 
enter into the present rather than to merely observe it, to apprehend not just the 
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arborescent image present in consciousness ("the arcs of circuits") but also the complete 
circuit, the circuits of circuits, the rhizomatic interrelatedness that is the sacred (Steps 
145).1 4 In 1967, Bateson wrote that art "has a positive function in maintaining what I 
called 'wisdom,' i.e., in correcting a too purposive view of life and making the view more 
systematic" (Steps 147). Yet the function he names is not a quality or property of any 
specific work of art; it is rather a way of describing what can happen through the 
mediation of art in its articulation of a conjunctive synthesis between the conscious and 
the unconscious, between the secular and the aesthetic. In 1979, Bateson observed: 
[FJunction is inherent in relations and not in things. An ax 
does not have a use. The use of an ax is related to its 
position between a person and a tree. Now if you want to 
ask about the function of aesthetics I will say, well, 
between what and what, within what whole are you 
attributing function to what parts? "Function" is a part 
word and not a whole word. Aesthetics and sacred tend to 
be whole words, words about wholes, and you can't talk 
about the function of a whole. It is no good saying, "What 
is the meaning of the universe?".. .Because to say, "What is 
the meaning of the universe?" assumes there is another 
entity for whom the universe has meaning. Meaning is not 
internal. It is between parts. (Sacred Unity 304) 
Meaning 
It is that phrase "between parts" that is critical to any further exploration of the 
exponentially expanding cybernetic Minds which Bateson proposes, within and between 
which his critical and ecological epistemology recursively resonates. Meaning is 
constructed rather than innate, and it is dynamic rather than static—it arises in 
relationship and flows between differences; meaning is information. Information is the 
stuff of mental process, and for Bateson, "the mental world—the mind—the world of 
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information processing—is not limited by the skin" (Steps 460). The ecology of mind 
that Gregory Bateson proposed would resonate with the patterns that connect not only 
across disciplinary boundaries but also across the discrete self-referencing entities or 
selves that are parts of this larger, cybernetic whole. In his introduction to Steps to an 
Ecology of Mind, Bateson suggested that his primary reason for assembling the book was 
not to answer questions but rather to ask them, to initiate the first round of a recursive 
epistemology that would resonate long beyond his own mortality. He proposes such 
questions as "How do ideas interact? Is there some kind of natural selection which 
determines the survival of some ideas and the extinction or death of others? What sorts of 
economics limits the multiplicity of ideas in a given region of mind?" (Steps xxiii). In 
Mind and Nature, he asks, "What pattern connects the crab to the lobster and the orchid 
to the primrose and all the four of them to me? And me to you?" (Mind and Nature 7). 
His final book, Angels Fear, was, as he wrote, "intended to begin the task of making the 
new challenges perceptible to the reader and perhaps to give some definition to the new 
problem. Further than that I do not expect to go" (Angels Fear 14). To pursue the 
constellation of recursive inquiry that Bateson launches, it is necessary to consider how 
his ideas have been both explicitly and implicitly circulated through an ecology of Mind, 
to look for echoes of his epistemology across the orders of contemporary thought. John 
Brockman suggests in his Introduction to About Bateson: Essays on Gregory Bateson that 
"Bateson is not clearly understood because his work is not an explanation, but a 
commission" (5-6). Bateson, when asked to write an Afterword to this collection, quoted 
himself as having responded, "Don't let it be a Festschrift" and instead suggested to 
Brockman that "you would ask your authors rather for some work and thinking of theirs 
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his ideas have been both explicitly and i plicitly circulated through an ecology of ind, 
to look for echoes of his episte ology across the orders of conte porary thought. John 
rock an suggests in his Introduction to bout ateson: Essays on regory ateson that 
"Bateson is not clearly understood because his work is not an explanation, but a 
co ission" (5-6). Bateson, when asked to write an Afterword to this collection, quoted 
himself as having responded, "Don't let it be a Festschrift," and instead suggested to 
Brockman that "you would ask your authors rather for some work and thinking of theirs 
that might have developed out of or alongside some part of my work" (235). That 
suggestion will serve as the commission necessary to take the further steps into this 
ecology of Mind, steps towards an ecology of the situation. 
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 It is also noteworthy that it was during this period of his personal life that Bateson met, married, and 
worked with anthropologist Margaret Mead. Together they published another anthropological work, 
Balinese Character, and their only child, daughter Mary Catherine Bateson, actively assisted her father in 
his later publications. 
2
 William Bateson gained notoriety for his efforts to revitalize the theories of Gregor Mendel. Bateson is 
credited with coining the term "genetics," and his youngest son was named Gregory as a nod to Mendel. 
For an extensive discussion of the senior Bateson's influence on his son's career and interest in anti-
Darwinian notions related to both genetic and somatic change, see David Lipset's biography entitled 
Gregory Bateson: The Legacy of a Scientist. Lipset also contributed an abbreviated version of this story in 
his chapter "Gregory Bateson: Early Biography" to John Brockman's collection About Bateson: Essays on 
Gregory Bateson. 
3
 The theory of logical types was advanced by A.N. Whitehead and B. Russell in 1910's Principia 
Mathematica as a means of avoiding the paradox that arises when a set or category of objects is confused 
with the discrete members of that set. To distinguish between a class and its members so as to avoid the 
paradox of conflation, the theory of logical types demanded that the logical level of any term must clearly 
specify its level. Bateson and his associates, developing a series of theories about communicative paradox 
and its pathological manifestation in schizophrenia, extended the notion of logical types to hierarchical and 
sequential levels of learning. The groundbreaking 1956 lecture, "Toward a Theory of Schizophrenia," and 
1964's "The Logical Categories of Learning and Communication," both contained in Part III: Form and 
Pathology in Relationship in Steps to an Ecology of Mind reflect Bateson's application of Russell's 
theories to his own work. I am also indebted to Bradford Keeney's Aesthetics of Change for a clearly stated 
exegesis of both Russell's theories and Bateson's appropriation of them. 
4
 Included in the Bateson bibliography is A Sacred Unity: Further Steps to an Ecology of Mind. Published 
in 1991, a decade after Bateson's death, by editor Rodney E. Donaldson, who served as literary editor for 
the Bateson estate, this is a collection of additional lectures and essays by Gregory Bateson. Donaldson 
chose to present this material following the same section headings and chronological ordering as that of the 
original Steps to an Ecology of Mind, while also adding a final selection of Bateson's works under the 
heading "Health, Ethics, Aesthetics, and the Sacred." While not originally conceived by Gregory Bateson, 
this work is significant for its additions to his epistemology. Donaldson also compiled an exhaustive 
bibliography of the entire canon of Bateson's published work (including articles, reviews, interviews and 
books) which is also included in A Sacred Unity. 
5
 "Abduction" is a term that Bateson liberates from the philosopher C.S. Peirce. Noting that Peirce applied 
the word to "that part of the process of inquiry which proposes that a given set of phenomena is a case 
under some previously proposed rule," Bateson characteristically gives the phrase his own interpretation 
and employs it in that redefined capacity. See the 1976 essay, "A Formal Approach to Explicit, Implicit, 
and Embodied Ideas and to Their Forms of Interaction''' reprinted in Donaldson's A Sacred Unity, p. 186. 
6
 In order to fully connect Bateson's research on schizophrenia and double bind theory, see the essays 
"Toward a Theory of Schizophrenia" and "Double Bind, 1969," both included in Steps to an Ecology of 
Mind. 
7
 For an excellent explanation of the limitations of Russell's Theory of Logical Types, specifically with 
regard to paradox, and to the ways in which Bateson recycled these theories productively, see Bradford P. 
Keeney's Aesthetics of Change, an invaluable application of Bateson's theories to the practice of family 
therapy. Keeney notes that "Bateson adopted logical typing as a descriptive tool for discerning the formal 
patterns of communication that underlie human experience and interaction" and that "logical typing can 
therefore be simply regarded as a way of drawing distinctions. From this perspective, logical typing can be 
used to disclose rather than conceal self-reference and paradox" (30). 
28 
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Bateson's theoretical understanding of difference and its implications for pattern, number, and cybernetic 
mind are more thoroughly discussed in Part II of this thesis. 
9
 The strength of Mind and Nature is not in its tone or writing style, which is almost abrasively abrupt in 
contrast to the eloquent, if circuitous, rhythms of Steps to an Ecology of Mind, but in its embodiment of 
Bateson's own evolution as a thinker. In his Afterword to a compilation of essays produced out of the 1979 
Asilomar Conference honoring Gregory Bateson, philosopher and logician Stephen Toulmin roundly 
criticizes both the style and content of Mind and Nature. While I agree with his negative response to the 
general tone of the book, written during a period of serious illness for Bateson and with considerable 
editorial input from his daughter, I disagree with his other assessments. In what I believe to be a serious 
misreading, Toulmin observes, "In many ways, indeed, Bertrand Russell is the last philosopher one would 
have expected Bateson to choose as an ally. (C.S. Peirce would have been a happier choice.) Neither in his 
epistemology nor in his logic did Russell ever show much sensitivity toward the significance of 
evolutionary ways of thought" (367). Toulmin is mistaken on both counts. Bateson does in fact use Peirce's 
ideas in his work (see Notes 5 and 10 to this section), and to suggest that he was seeking an ally in Russell 
is to misunderstand the concept of abduction as Bateson employs it. Bateson demonstrates abduction here 
as the transgression of disciplinary boundaries (not the search for allies) and as the abstract leap to 
recognition of pattern in situations where pattern may not first be apparent. Bateson found great resonance 
in the logical and mathematical elegance of Russell's theories and used them quite originally to found his 
own theories of learning and knowledge process; in Mind and Nature, he is engaged precisely in evolving 
those concepts beyond Russell's intended use without feeling either the necessity or the desirability of 
abandoning them. 
1 0
 Bateson contrasts feedback and calibration using the rifle/shotgun example in both Mind and Nature and 
in Angels Fear, but he appears to introduce a distinction in the latter example. In Mind and Nature, both the 
rifle and the shotgun are employed to shoot a flying bird, while in the Angels Fear chapter he seems to 
suggest that only in the instance of the shotgun is the target mobile. The emphasis on the ability for error 
correction prior to shooting the rifle, to effectively view each instance of rifle shot as a singular act of 
feedback and correction made prior to the actual firing of the shot is easier to visualize if the rifle is aimed 
at a stationary target. In the case of the shotgun, Bateson's emphasis is on the fact that there is no 
possibility for error correction within the single act of shooting; calibration, or a class of serial actions 
ultimately resulting in an improved performance, requires a recursive practice. 
1 1
 Author Bill Brown devotes the second chapter of his book A Sense of Things to the concepts of 
repetition and iteration, drawing heavily from the philosophies of Charles Saunders Peirce, from whom 
Bateson adapted the idea of "abduction." Also referencing the work of such disparate figures as William 
James, Gertrude Stein, and the French theorist Gilles Deleuze, Brown's thoughts on noniterative repetition 
and on habit formation are both instructive and eerily close to Bateson's development of the idea of 
calibration. Specifically, he notes that Deleuze makes a fine distinction between repetition and replication. 
If calibration both requires the repetition or practice of an act that is always subtly altered by the error 
perception and correction of the previous instantiation of that act, then as Brown notes, "If no event (given 
its uniqueness in time) is reducible to another, then 'repetition' must name a difference" (73). See Part II of 
this thesis for a more thorough discussion of Bateson's use of difference and its relation to the work of 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari. 
1 2
 The work of Chileans Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela diverges sharply from that of Bateson, 
emphasizing autonomous self-referencing and closed systems that lack the connective holism Bateson 
envisions for his cybernetic Mind. A comparison of these competing philosophies is beyond the scope of 
this paper. For a brief discussion of the points of both confluence and divergence of their work with that of 
Bateson, see the section entitled "Autopoiesis: The Bootstrapping of Form" in Harries-Jones' Recursive 
Vision. 
1 3
 Bateson engages the idea of self-reference and the notion of self repeatedly throughout his various 
essays, lectures, and books, yet his ideas are seldom referenced by post-modern authors struggling with the 
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same issues. In 1977, Bateson addressed a conference in New York on "The Birth of a Matrix, or Double 
Bind and Epistemology," reprinted in A Sacred Unity. In this lengthy lecture, in which he traces many of 
the lines of flight that contribute to the outlines of his cybernetic epistemology, he suggests that the 
discursive pathology of double bind might spur some creative alternative, some kind of resistant response 
that might radically alter the pathology from which it springs. He also suggests that there are other answers 
to other questions that lie beyond the double bind, including the notion of self, that "half mythological 
entity whose apparent subjective reality somehow increases in situations of reflexive awareness." While 
beyond the scope of this paper, it would be interesting to interrogate Bateson's notions of the self and self-
referentiality against those proposed by members of the Franklin School and those articulated by Judith 
Butler in Giving an Account of Oneself. For Butler, the paradox in the attempt to account for the self is that 
the self can never know its origin; its originating response, its first act of distinction, is in response to the 
demand of another. In his 1977 Afterword to John Brockman's About Bateson: Essays on Gregory 
Bateson. Bateson uses a poetic description of a smoke ring, introverted and endlessly turning upon itself, as 
a figure for a self that is called not by another but rather forms out of the self-same material as its 
environment, given "duration and location and a certain degree of separation by virtue of its inturned 
motion" (246). 
1 4
 In his often expressed belief in the power of art and its relationship to the unconscious, Bateson's 
theories resonate both with and against those of Theodor W. Adorno and other members of the Frankfurt 
School. Like Adorno, Bateson felt that art had the power to convey the "shock of the unintelligible," to 
offer a liminal space within which aesthetic truths might be uncovered. Bateson saw art as metaphoric and 
as engaging something more than mere consciousness; he distinguished between the aesthetic and 
appetitive, disparaging the purposive much as Adorno problematized what he considered to be committed 
art, the deliberately political. In his 1962 essay, "Commitment," Adorno wrote that "it is not the office of 
art to spotlight alternatives, but to resist by its form alone the course of the world, which permanently puts a 
pistol to men's heads" (304). Bateson would, I think, agree with this assessment. Despising the purely 
purposive and linguistic appropriation of art by the conscious mind (the univocal question, "What does art 
'say'?"), he preferred to interrogate how art, metaphor, and dreams open un-labeled un-named potentiality 
(he was fond of Isadora Duncan's response, "If I could tell you what it meant, there would be no point in 
dancing it." See Steps, p. 137). 
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PART II: WHEN A FRENCHMAN WAVES HIS ARMS 
One of the fundamental questions which Gregory Bateson advances in Steps to an 
Ecology of Mind is to consider whether, if we accept the parallels between the world of 
natural evolutionary process and the world of mental process, there might be something 
analogous to natural selection with respect to ideas. Do some ideas survive while others 
die? He notes that "Socrates as a bioenergetic individual is dead. But much of him still 
lives as a component in the contemporary ecology of ideas" (Steps 467). As with 
Socrates, so with Gregory Bateson—while some of his ideas have long been adapted out 
of the ecology of mind, some have continued to circulate, combining and mutating with 
those of other theorists, philosophers, ethicists, critics, and activists in the richly diverse 
heterogeneous idea-pool that is the cybernetic mind. 
Like the map of any genome, Bateson's ideas are expressed in some cases 
explicitly, in reiterative chains which make identification apparent, while in other 
contexts only nuanced traces remain in recombinant mutations that only implicitly 
suggest his lines of thought. Many of his students and professional colleagues tend to 
interpret or to extend Bateson's ideas strictly within the disciplinary context that 
characterizes their association with him; hence, Bradford Keeney, who studied with 
Bateson during his period of intense interest in psychology, applies Bateson's ecological 
premises to the practice of family therapy. In a similar vein, Carol Wilder-Mott and John 
Weakland encounter Bateson strictly in terms of his cybernetic theory, without extending 
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his observations beyond that somewhat narrow range of his interests. Other readers of 
Bateson's work engage his notions of pattern and ecology more directly by applying 
them to environmental themes across a variety of humanities genres. In 1980, agrarian 
author and poet Wendell Berry's poem "A Grace" bears the subheading for Gregory 
Bateson and references "the chief beauty of the world, pattern of patterns" (8-9). In an 
evocatively lyrical chapter on "Place" in The Eros of Everyday Life, feminist writer 
Susan Griffin argues for the incontrovertibility of an interdependence between human 
thought and the natural world, observing that "if by means of duality Western culture has 
secured the illusion of transcendence, the culture is also blind to the order and pattern, the 
memory and intelligence, all the qualities of abstract thought, that exist in nature" (81). It 
is hardly surprising that on the following page she references Gregory Bateson and his 
use of the "Men are grass" syllogism to support her argument that abstract thought and 
metaphor are as characteristic of the natural world as of the mental. Ecocritics Deborah 
Bird Rose and Libby Robin, writing in the Australian Humanities Review, note Bateson's 
contribution to discipline-spanning thought in their argument in support of the emerging 
interdisciplinary collaboration we call environmental humanities. In Perform or Else: 
From Discipline to Performance, Jon McKenzie notes the importance of Gregory 
Bateson's work as foundational for theories of performance and play, employing his 
cybernetic models of feedback and recursiveness in conjunctive synthesis with the 
machinic apparatus of Deleuze and Guattari to identify patterns across seemingly 
disparate vectors of performance in the United States since the 1950s. What is 
particularly striking about McKenzie's use of Bateson's theories of play and fantasy is 
that his genealogy of Batesonian thought and influence stays firmly lodged in a citational 
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33 
connection to anthropology and to cultural performance; McKenzie seems unaware of the 
far more direct and provocative patterns that connect Gregory Bateson to Gilles Deleuze 
and Felix Guattari, a connection that exemplifies Bateson's survival in the contemporary 
ecology of mind. 
Gregory Bateson's thought and work had an enormous impact on the generation 
of French thinkers who emerged as critical theorists following the university protests of 
1968. As Verena Conley elaborates in her critical pursuit of evidence of environmental 
consciousness in the work of contemporary French postmodernists, those emerging 
voices also tended to seize on the systemic and ecological implications of Bateson's 
cybernetic mind and to subsequently adapt them to their own lines of argument1 (56). 
Bateson's influence on both Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari is manifestly evident, as 
these authors frankly acknowledge their debt to Bateson's imagery and ideas while 
extending them in a way that far exceeds theoretical and disciplinary boundaries. Writing 
together in 1980, philosopher Gilles Deleuze and psychiatrist Felix Guattari published A 
Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, a radically unorthodox collection of 
collaborative thought which borrows its title from Gregory Bateson's ethnographic 
comparisons of Iatmul and Balinese culture. Bateson observed that while overtly 
competitive interpersonal behavior between Iatmul tribal members frequently led to some 
kind of climax, followed by a differentiation or change in behavioral norms 
(schismogenesis), personal interaction in Balinese culture seemed deliberately and 
culturally orchestrated to avoid climactic moments of cumulative personal interaction. 
Instead, he noted that "it is possible that some sort of continuing plateau of intensity" is 
substituted for a climax in certain kinds of Balinese cultural situations, a substitution that 
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34 
discourages competitive behavior in a variety of interactions, including quarrels (Steps 
113). It is that same plateau that Deleuze and Guattari incorporate into their title and into 
their most familiar metaphor, the rhizome. Noting that "a plateau is always in the middle" 
and that "a rhizome is made of plateaus," they seize on Bateson's plateau, elaborating on 
his usage of the term as a way "to designate something very special: a continuous, self-
vibrating region of intensities whose development avoids any orientation toward a 
culmination point or external end" (22). They adopt Bateson's terminology and 
subsequently develop it, as he would, into their own: 
We call a "plateau" any multiplicity connected to other 
multiplicities by superficial underground stems in such a 
way as to form or extend a rhizome. We are writing this 
book as a rhizome. It is composed of plateaus. We have 
given it a circular form. (22) 
Just as the reference to plateau originates with Bateson and then mutates into 
something that is both familiar and yet radically new in the Deleuze/Guattari context, 
there are numerous other images and phrases that circulate throughout A Thousand 
Plateaus which have their germination in Bateson. Schizophrenia, double-bind theory, 
and a metaphoric use of organic images as abductive syntheses across perceived 
boundaries are only part of a remarkable confluence of thought that flows between this 
text and Steps to an Ecology of Mind. All contribute to a pattern that connects, a 
connection that emerges in a between that is "by no means an average; on the contrary, it 
is where things pick up speed.. .a perpendicular direction, a transversal movement that 
sweeps one and the other away" (Deleuze and Guattari 25). 
The imprint of Gregory Bateson on Felix Guattari is even more apparent. Guattari 
begins his 1989 book, The Three Ecologies, with a quote from a 1969 Bateson lecture, 
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35 
"Pathologies of Epistemology," and his call for "a praxic opening-out" of the three 
ecologies, the natural, the mental, and the social surely springs from Bateson's 
observation in that same lecture that "when you separate mind from the structure in 
which it is immanent, such as human relationship, the human society, or the ecosystem, 
you thereby embark, I believe, on a fundamental error, which in the end will surely hurt 
you" (Three Ecologies 53, Steps 493). Guattari notes Bateson's assertions about the 
necessity for the ecology of mind to extend beyond the corporeal limitations of the 
individual body, an argument that supports his own call for the recognition of the 
interdependency of three heterogeneous ecologies (Three Ecologies 54). 
Guattari begins his 1995 book Chaosophy with an essay entitled, "So What," 
replicating the title of the concluding metalogue of Bateson's Mind and Nature. Here he 
notes his own eclectic interests, reminiscent of Bateson's disciplinary cross-fertilization, 
reflecting that "I was preoccupied with joining together different layers of things which 
fascinated me: the philosophy of science, logic, biology, early works in cybernetics [this 
is clearly a nod to Bateson]" and suggests that "my problem is to extract elements from 
one domain in order to transfer them into other fields of application" (8-9). While much 
of this collection of essays and interviews focuses on his work with Gilles Deleuze and 
their explicit linking of capitalism and schizophrenia, Bateson's influence is apparent in 
the opening section. 
His final book, Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm, offers Guattari's 
idiosyncratic insights into the same problems of the aesthetic and the sacred, viewed as a 
paradigmatic wholism, that absorbed Bateson in Angels Fear. As Bateson attempted to 
develop an interface between these two concepts, he often employed an almost prophetic 
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tone, asking "what is it to move through a larger and more complex mental system, 
involved in multiple encounters with other mental subsystems, each of which offers a 
certain possibility of wholeness?" (Angels Fearl77). Guattari proposes a similar 
interface, noting that "the refoundation of politics will have to pass through the aesthetic 
and analytical dimensions implied in the three ecologies—the environment, the socius 
and the psyche" (Chaosmosis 20). That such an interface contains both potential for 
growth and potential for runaway, a critical understanding in Bateson's epistemology, 
also resurfaces in Guattari; his description of "Chaosmosis" as "a coming and going at 
infinite speed between chaos and complexity" is again reminiscent of Bateson's 
hypothetical model of mental process, depicted in Mind and Nature as a "zigzag ladder of 
dialectic between form and process" (Chaosmosis 75, Mind and Nature 182). Just as 
Bateson recognizes that there is, within cybernetic mind, the potential for insanity, so 
Guattari goes on to note that "the submersion in chaosmic immanence is always ready to 
exploit the slightest weakness" (Steps 493, Chaosmosis 75). 
Even as the explicit connections among Bateson and Deleuze and Guattari attest 
to Bateson's ongoing vibrancy as a foundational theorist, there are other, less overt 
connections to be made in order to fulfill the commission that his work assigns his 
readers. Just as abduction demands abstractive leaps that ignore the fictive boundary 
between mind and nature, so can the same methodology allow the mapping of patterns 
which are implicitly suggestive rather than explicitly drawn. Shortly before his untimely 
death in 1995, Gilles Deleuze was contemplating a collaboration with a younger French 
philosopher and ethicist, one with whom he had entertained a long-standing academic 
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emergence of a postmodern subject in the wake of a founding event, and on related 
questions of ethics and activism, an activism that is both politically and socially 
motivated. Read in conjunction with the patterned intersections between Bateson and 
Deleuze/Guattari, yet another set of patterns begins to emerge, drawn this time not from 
explicit reference but from certain repetitions and iterations that are seductively familiar. 
In his ongoing interest in both difference and in pattern, Bateson noted what he termed 
the moire phenomenon, the possibility that one might "investigate an unfamiliar pattern 
by combining it with a known second pattern and inspecting the third pattern which they 
together generate" (Mind and Nature 74). Out of difference, pattern might yet emerge in 
those very iterations across apparently unconnected philosophies. To recursively consider 
those refrains and their potential application to contemporary issues of critical theory, 
environmental rhetoric, and ecosocial praxis, one must first locate those patterns that 
oscillate between Gregory Bateson and the radical intellectual gesturing of these 
contemporary French thinkers. 
Gregory Bateson founds his notion of the cybernetic mind with an interrogation of 
difference, a discussion which is repeated in the work of Deleuze and Guattari and in that 
of Alain Badiou. Each of these authors would ultimately see difference as dispersing into 
a radically multiple consistency, a heterogeneous Same that is not sameness, a polysemic 
universal singularity. Each ultimately looks to a more diffuse ethos—the mind, the 
rhizome, the situation—as a more-than-temporal site of cybernetic fecundity, of desiring-
production, of subject-inducing fidelity. To trace the intersections of their singular voices 
is to reveal the resonance of a multivocal and kaleidoscopic ecology of mind. 
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In his autobiographical reflection first published in 1940, G.H. Hardy wrote that 
"a mathematician, like a painter or a poet, is a maker of patterns" (84). It is not by 
coincidence that each of these radical thinkers, Bateson, Deleuze/Guattari, and Badiou, 
invokes mathematics as a semiotic language with which to navigate an infinite 
potentiality that can only be realized in the move from the individualized and culturally 
constructed One to the universally singular 1, to that which is both greater than and less 
than the linguistic signifier. Mathematician and cultural theorist Brian Rotman notes that 
formal mathematics is without "indexical expressions, those fundamental and universal 
elements of natural languages whereby such terms as ' I , ' 'you,' 'here,' 'this,' as well as 
tensed verbs, tie the meaning of messages to the physical context of their utterance" (Ad 
Infinitum 7). Using mathematical notation allows these writers to avoid the limitations of 
denotative and connotative grammars, allowing their work to be more generative, more 
generic, and to foreground their concepts in a descriptive and relational context, rather 
than in one constricted by linguistic delimitation and overcoding. 
It is Bateson who recognizes that "epistemology is always and inevitably 
personal" that the meaning which emerges in any relationship between things or persons 
or circumstances is constrained and constructed by the expressive vehicle used to map 
that relationship (Mind and Nature 82). Language produces only one side of any 
relationship; language, for Bateson, has a tendency to stabilize (and thus to fix) 
meaning.. .and therefore to overlay a temporal index onto a fluid construction, to locate a 
pattern while perhaps obscuring the fact of its mobility. Writing that "number is of the 
world of pattern, gestalt, and digital computation," he uses mathematics to illustrate 
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pattern, patterns of connection and comprehension and patterns of epistemological error 
(Mind and Nature 46). 
Bateson emphasizes that there is a vast difference between "the ordinal name of 
the given odd number and its cardinal value," and in that difference we move to 
recognize that there is a vast difference between the linguistically fixed and subjectively 
isolatable One and the material and integral 1 (Mind and Nature 71). Deleuze and 
Guattari pursue much the same distinction in their notion of the numbered number (again, 
one, two, three) and the numbering number (1,2,3) which represents for them "the 
countersignifying semiotic.. .a numerical sign that is not produced by something outside 
the system of marking it institutes" (118). They combine number and language in a series 
of equations intended to deterritorialize familiar perceptions, to create ruptures in habitual 
thought processes, and to escape the limitations of the culturally bound and binding 
linguistic semiotic. Badiou goes even farther; "for Badiou, mathematics is ontology," and 
mathematics is therefore the most appropriate language for articulating his philosophy 
(Feltham and Clemens 10). Much of his work is couched in terms of equations and 
formulas, semiotic expressions of relationship and pattern that yield both connection and 
contradiction when considered alongside the work of Bateson and Deleuze and Guattari 
in plateaus of interaction within which minds become Mind. 
Difference 
(n -1) = Multiplicity 
1:1 ± One 
I suggest to you, now, that the word "idea," in its most elementary sense, is synonymous 
with "difference." Kant, in the Critique of Judgment—if I understand him correctly— 
asserts that the most elementary aesthetic act is the selection of a fact. He argues that in a 
piece of chalk there are an infinite number of potential facts.. .1 suggest that Kant's 
statement can be modified to say that there is an infinite number of differences around 
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and within the piece of chalk.. .And within the piece of chalk, there is for every molecule 
an infinite number of differences between its location and the locations in which it might 
have been. Of this infinitude, we select a very limited number, which become 
information. In fact, what we mean by information—the elementary unit of 
information—is a difference which makes a difference (Gregory Bateson, Steps to an 
Ecology of Mind 459). 
The diagonal frees itself, breaks or twists. The line no longer forms a contour, and instead 
passes between things, between points. It belongs to a smooth space. It draws a plane that 
has no more dimensions than that which crosses it; therefore the multiplicity it constitutes 
is no longer subordinated to the One, but takes on a consistency of its own (Deleuze and 
Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus 505). 
[GJenuine thought should affirm the following principle: since differences are what there 
is, and since every truth is the coming-to-be of that which is not yet, so differences are 
then precisely what truths depose, or render insignificant. No light is shed on any 
concrete situation by the notion of the 'recognition of the other' (Alain Badiou, Ethics 
27). 
In one of several "Metalogues" with which he begins Steps to an Ecology of 
Mind, Gregory Bateson's interlocutory voice responds to the question "Why do things 
have outlines?" with a more provocative question, "Do you mean 'Why do we give 
things outlines when we draw them?' or do you mean that the things have outlines 
whether we draw them or not?" (Steps 27). His exploration of the notion of difference is 
interwoven with his interest in issues of pattern and symmetry. As his disciplinary 
affiliation moved through biology to anthropology and across psychology into 
cybernetics, he began to formulate a notion of difference as an operation in mental 
process, the predominant function in the conscious mind. In a 1954 paper Bateson 
suggests that the human mind relies on the imposition of difference in order to avoid the 
discomforts produced by abstraction (Steps 189). By 1969, he simply states that "a 
difference which makes a difference is an idea. It is a 'bit,' a unit of information" (Steps 
272). Difference is descriptive and discriminatory; viewed as a process or a practice, it is 
the ability to segregate and to isolate, to categorize and to classify, to identify the 
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concrete elements or relata that are part of (or that are not part of) a system or set. The 
ability to make distinctions about levels of meaning is of a higher order of mental process 
than the ability to distinguish between this material thing and that material thing, between 
this object which I name "cat" and that object which I name "horse". For Bateson, the 
imposition of difference as a concrete delimiter of things is the first step in a progressive 
movement of learning that must ultimately exceed itself. Just as an idea is information of 
a difference, so a difference is itself only an idea. Difference is neither material nor 
measurable; it is rather the representation of a relationship.5 Difference may be 
considered here not as a limitation, nor as a set of attributes, but as that irreducible and 
liminal space wherein meaning may be drawn, in the most literal fashion, by imposing 
outlines. Difference and Sameness are thus merely qualities that emerge on either side of 
the outlines themselves; they are effects of comparison, perspectives rather than 
quantities, and are thus mutable, volatile conventions of perception rather than essences 
of being. The communication of a difference (or as Bateson specifies, news of a 
difference that makes a difference) is information, an idea rather than a truth. If 
difference is the warp of mental process, then information is the weft, which moves over 
and under, through and between, the outlines that knowing produces. For Bateson, 
difference is the coin of the realm of mental process; if "mind is an aggregate of 
interacting parts or components," then the interaction between those parts that is the 
source of its coherence as mind is the perception of discontinuity (Mind and Nature 85). 
This perception of difference he thus defines as "an event, a step function," one that 
triggers or causes events or changes which induce the aggregation of minds in the 
forming of outlines, the drawing of distinctions. Unarticulated differences have no 
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materiality—"those distinctions that remain undrawn are not" (Mind and Nature 90). 
Like Kant, Bateson acknowledges that a plenitude of differences abounds in the ongoing 
context of our existence, but he is only interested (and can only be interested) in those 
differences which make a difference.6 
Deleuze and Guattari focus on difference as convention, as a semantic paradox of 
description that arises out of a communicative necessity: "in order to designate something 
exactly, anexact expressions are utterly unavoidable. Not at all because it is a necessary 
step or because one can only advance by approximations.. .it is the exact passage of that 
which is under way" (20). Difference captured and reified as a negative thematic appears 
throughout A Thousand Plateaus as signification, as segmentation, as sedentarity, as a 
tracing, a boundary. Difference is a distraction, an artificial construct that can only be 
seen as nonproductive; it is a discrimination that will dissipate in the move to the 
rhizomatic middle, a vector that will "nullify endings and beginnings" (25). Difference 
reified, difference abstracted from its processual role at the intersection of signification 
and subjectivity becomes difference concretized as faciality, as the face, as singular 
identity, "the white wall/black hole system" (167). Focusing the gaze on difference leads 
to both the inward recognition of a separate self and the outward perception of the other; 
in either case, difference produces the starkly defined outlines that are 
descriptive/definitive of Cartesian duality, outlines that serve to imprison and to restrict. 
For Deleuze and Guattari, "the face is a politics," and difference is a manifestation of 
social power that reinscribes lines of hegemony rather than lines of flight (181). 
Segmentarity carves out the singular and produces lines that become impenetrable 
boundaries preventing the formation of multiplicities and the becoming-potential that is 
riality-"t   . 
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not attainable in the homogeneity of the One. In that 'hole-ism" that results from the 
singularizing effect of difference, there is not plenitude but emptiness; identity predicated 
on difference is trapped in a pit of its own making. 
For Badiou, difference is both fundamental and problematic; its invocation is the 
basis for most humanist ethics, and its reinscription through that discourse defeats his 
fundamental project wherein a truth-process can emerge. Recall that for Bateson, news of 
a difference constitutes information, which in the unconscious mind conveys something 
about relationships and serves to spark the integration of elements that coheres in the 
aggregate he calls a mind. Captured in language by the conscious mind, however, 
difference becomes something else. Consciousness "talks about things or persons," which 
quantifies and localizes difference as limitation (Steps 139). Badiou names not 
information but opinion as "the primary material of all communication" which in a like 
manner serves to circulate news of difference; while opinion also serves to consolidate 
humanity along the lines of differences that are constitutive of identities, it is "beneath 
the true and the false, precisely because its sole office is to be communicable" (Ethics 50-
51). Identifying in contemporary ethics the continued colonization of the Other by an 
insistence upon a "right to difference" that presupposes (and therefore redoubles) an 
inferiority assumed in that alterity, Badiou proposes a radically alternative approach. 
Beginning with the assumption that "infinite alterity is quite simply what there is" 
Badiou proposes to found his ontology not in what is, "the infinite multiplicity of 
differences," but in the Same, in "what comes to be" (Ethics 25-27). Difference is not 
swept away—in a truth-process it is not recognized or outlined. Because difference is a 
priori, for all, it cannot function as a delimiting factor.7 A truth, which is "indifferent to 
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differences" in its emergence through a truth-process, makes possible the advent of the 
Same (Ethics 27). 
How might these very different notions of difference serve to inform or to 
problematize one another? Bateson emphasizes that an unacknowledged difference has 
no meaning; it produces no information and is consequently unrecognized. Mental 
process is characterized by some triggering event/change that, while initiated in news of a 
difference that makes a difference, is itself not the separation into identity but rather the 
coherence of mind, the aggregation or assemblage of multiple parts into some greater 
whole which is itself dynamic, cybernetic. Pattern is both connected and connecting, the 
expression of mind's aggregation and yet excessive, more-than the perceptions that 
recognize it. Difference/alterity/opinion resonates beneath and throughout an ecology of 
mind or an ontological situation; truth, which for Badiou signals the coming-to-be of the 
Same is only enabled by an event, a rupture.. .and how is that not comparable to 
Bateson's notion that news of difference enables the coming-to-be of a mind in the 
altered perception that can only be facilitated by a rupture in pattern: 
But the pattern may be changed or broken by addition, by 
repetition, by anything that will force you to a new perception of it, 
and these changes can never be predicted with absolute certainty 
because they have not yet happened. (Mind and Nature 26) 
Badiou repeatedly addresses the idea of cultural differences and their limitations 
o 
on the kinds of potential that truth-processes are intended to generate. For Badiou, 
identity politics becomes an autopoietic limitation rather than an evental site for the 
emergence of a truth-process. In Saint Paul he writes that "neither can a truth procedure 
take root in the element of identity. For if it is true that every truth erupts as singular, its 
singularity is immediately universalizable. Universalizable singularity necessarily breaks 
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on the kinds of potential that truth-processes are intended to generate. 8 For Badiou, 
identity politics becomes an autopoietic limitation rather than an evental site for the 
emergence of a truth-process. In Saint Paul he writes that "neither can a truth procedure 
take root in the element of identity. For ifit is true that every truth erupts as singular, its 
singularity is immediately universalizable. Universalizable singularity necessarily breaks 
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with identitarian singularity" (Saint Paul 11). Universalizable singularity can be restated 
as the numbering number 1,9 while identarian singularity finds itself connotatively and 
denotatively outlined in the semiotic One, in the conceptual signified that reinscribes the 
Subject and the subjective. Badiou argues that the fragmentation of contemporary society 
is deliberately sustained by the marketplace: 
For each identification (the creation or cobbling together of 
identity) creates a figure that provides a material for its 
investment by the market. There is nothing more captive, 
so far as commercial investment is concerned, nothing 
more amenable to the invention of new figures of monetary 
homogeneity, than a community and its territory or 
territories. The semblance of a nonequivalence is required 
so that equivalence itself can constitute a process. What 
inexhaustible potential for mercantile investments in this 
upsurge—taking the form of communities demanding 
recognition and so-called cultural singularities—of women, 
homosexuals, the disabled, Arabs! And these infinite 
combinations of predictive traits, what a god-send! Black 
homosexuals, disabled Serbs, Catholic pedophiles, 
moderate Muslims, married priests, ecologist 
yuppies.. .Capital demands a permanent creation of 
subjective and territorial identities in order for its principle 
of movement to homogenize its space of action; identities, 
moreover, that never demand anything but the right to be 
exposed in the same way as others to the uniform 
prerogatives of the market (Ethics 10-11). 
The manipulation of difference as a means of maintaining and even producing new 
markets for capitalism is a cautionary note that Badiou revisits in his political philosophy. 
He finds equally dangerous the tendency for identitarian logic to go a step further, 
valorizing its own difference by positing "that this culture's constitutive elements are 
only fully comprehensible on the condition that one belong to the subset in question," a 
condition that by its nature prevents the evental appearance of a truth-process (Saint Paul 
12). 1 0 
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And... And... And 
Not All 
The Same, in effect, is not what is (i.e. the infinite multiplicity of differences) but what 
comes to be. I have already named that in regard to which only the advent of the Same 
occurs: it is a truth. Only a truth is, as such, indifferent to differences (Alain Badiou, 
Ethics 27). 
All the material of human multiplicity can be fashioned, linked, by a 'consistency' (Alain 
Badiou, Ethics 48). 
Let us summarize the principle characteristics of a rhizome: unlike trees or their roots, the 
rhizome connects any point to any other point, and its traits are not necessarily linked to 
traits of the same nature.. .The rhizome is reducible neither to the One nor the multiple 
(Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus 21). 
Nothing will enter memory, everything was on the line, between the lines, in the AND 
that made one and the other imperceptible, without disjunction or conjunction but only a 
line of flight forever in the process of being drawn, toward a new acceptance, the 
opposite of renunciation or resignation—a new happiness? (Deleuze and Guattari, A 
Thousand Plateaus 206-207). 
What if "Truth" in some very large and, for us, overriding sense is information not about 
what we perceive (the green leaves, the stones, that voice, that face) but about the process 
of perception? (Gregory Bateson, Sacred Unity 227) 
That is an elementary example of something which is at the roots of beauty and 
something which is at the roots of the sacred. It is at the roots of how the world tends to 
be a unified world and not a dualistic world (Gregory Bateson, A Sacred Unity 300) 
Badiou identifies "three major dimensions of a truth-process," which he conceives 
of as the event, a rupture in ordinary process, a turn that is immanent in a specific 
situation and yet is not limited or bound by the conditions of that situation, the fidelity, 
which represents the vibratory emanation that is both the residue of the event and the 
infinite vector of process it generates, and the truth, "what the fidelity gathers together 
and produces," which in turn calls forth or produces an Immortal subject (Ethics 67-68). 
Truth is new, potent, generative; it is revealed by the event which ruptures the void of the 
situation, which punctuates the plenitude of knowledge that previously obscured this 
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universal singularity. Truth and the fidelity which gathers it induce a subject. A subject is 
"a local act of truth," a "point of truth" founded in material human bodies that participate 
in the composing of a subject, which is a consistency not limited to a single corporeal 
body—a subject may appear in a work of art, a scientific theory, a political movement, or 
in a pair of lovers (Infinite Thought 47, Ethics 44). 1 1 In this process of becoming-subject, 
"the 'some-one' thus caught up in what attests that he belongs to the truth-process as one 
of its foundation-points is simultaneously himself, nothing other than himself, a multiple 
singularity recognizable among all others, and in excess of himself, because the uncertain 
course.. .of fidelity passes through him" (Ethics 45). Critical to his argument is Badiou's 
insistence that the trajectory of a truth is both ongoing and consistent; truth is conceived 
not as the universal, total, or essential truth—there is no unified truth. Rather, the excess 
which emerges in a subject induced by truth is linked to the void from which it emerges; 
it is unknown and unchosen, not something which can be decided on between specific 
elements known a priori in a situation. It is this very not-known (and in a Batesonian 
way, unconscious) excess which gives consistency to the truth process; it is that which is 
universally singular, of the Same, which convokes its subject out of difference and into 
sameness and which forms itself around the potentiality present, yet until-now 
unrecognized, in the situation. 
It is only in a becoming-truth that the advent or coming of the Same can occur. It 
is not the addition of one to one but rather an iterative conjunction, a multiplicity that is 
accomplished by becoming "like everybody else," the ability to paint oneself out of 
foreground and into the background. Difference is subsumed by the multiplicity. It is "the 
magic formula we all seek—PLURALISM = MONISM" (A Thousand Plateaus 20). For 
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Deleuze and Guattari, the nonlinear metaphor of the rhizome as a liminal space which "is 
always in the middle, between things, interbeing" suggests generative potential in a 
combinatory multiplicity; "the rhizome is the conjunction" (25). There is in this smooth 
space a consistency that is also constructed in difference yet indifferent to it; defined as 
haecceity, it is intensity yet not homogeneity, "a powerful nonorganic life that escapes 
the strata, cuts across assemblages, and draws an abstract line without contour" (507). 
Guattari would later note that "no existential approach has priority over 
another.. .Relationship to the other does not proceed through identification with a 
preexisting icon, inherent to each individual" (Chaosmosis 95). Implicit in Deleuze and 
Guattari's notion of this Same is that individuality is not eradicated in multiplicity; in 
conjunction, in haecceity, the individual is not lost but is intensified, becoming-excessive. 
Bateson also longs to define as a kind of monism the ability to move from the 
dualism of the traditional mind/body distinction beyond the singular Self to the universal 
process or system he calls "Mind." This loss of singularity in a unifying nonlinearity is 
for Bateson the promise of the aesthetic of the sacred. He writes, "We have lost a 
wholeness of being which would include 'that' and the 'other' side together... The 
damage is the taking apart. The sacredness is the coming together" (Sacred Unity 301-
302). Implicit in his cybernetic model of that systemic coming together is another name 
for the void, for that undifferentiated unnamed liminal space from which truth may 
emerge. "All that is not information, not redundancy, not form and not restraints—is 
noise, the only possible source of new patterns" (Steps 416). Like Badiou, Bateson 
recognizes that it is only from out of the void of the situation, the un-named un-counted 
alterity that is immanent in the chaotic heart of existence, that the truth may be gathered. 
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Only out of the coherence of singular aspects can a cybernetic mind engender a faithful 
subject, one co-evolved in relationship (organism-plus-environment) with its context, one 
initiated in the ruptural difference that news of a difference opens up . 1 2 
Frame | Context | Frame 
Intensity = 0 
{0} 
But while the analogy of the mathematical set is perhaps over abstract, the analogy of the 
picture frame is excessively concrete. The psychological concept which we are trying to 
define is neither physical nor logical. Rather, the actual physical frame is, we believe, 
added by human beings to physical pictures because these human beings operate more 
easily in a universe in which some of their psychological characteristics are externalized 
(Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind 187) 
A BwO is made in such a way that it can be occupied, populated only by intensities. Only 
intensities pass and circulate. Still, the BwO is not a scene, a place, or even a support 
upon which something comes to pass. It has nothing to do with phantasy, there is nothing 
to interpret. The BwO causes intensities to pass; it produces and distributes them in a 
spatium that is itself intensive, lacking extension. It is not space, nor is it in space; it is 
matter that occupies space to a given degree—to the degree corresponding to the 
intensities produced. It is nonstratified, unformed, intense matter, the matrix of intensity, 
intensity = 0; but there is nothing negative about that zero, there are no negative or 
opposite intensities. Matter equals energy. Production of the real as an intensive 
magnitude starting at zero (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus 153). 
The concept of the situation is especially important, since I maintain that there can be no 
ethics in general, but only an ethic of singular truths, and thus an ethic relative to a 
particular situation. I now accept that a situation cannot be understood simply as a 
multiple [i.e. as a set]. We must also take into account the network of relations it sustains, 
which involves making sense of the way a multiple appears in the situation (Alain 
Badiou, Ethics lvi). 
One of several themes that flow across and between the work of Bateson, of 
Deleuze and Guattari, and of Badiou, is a metaphoric use of set theory to convey notions 
of framing and context, boundaries and relationships. Bateson uses set theory as an 
abstract metaphor to complement the more concrete example of the picture frame, which 
he uses to demonstrate that frames of reference not only distinguish subject from 
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surroundings, figure from ground, but also that framing constitutes meaning, meaning 
which is contingent upon framing. Bateson's discourse, like his examples, is 
metacommunicative; his movement from anthropological observations of cultural 
interactions through homologous biological structures to an emphasis on the 
psychological interaction of the unconscious (primary process) with the conscious 
(secondary process) is always a process of double description. His intent is to move from 
a discussion of "things which are related "(Steps 153, emphasis added) to a consideration 
of the relationships which circulate among those relata, an continued movement away 
from a vision of singular bound sets rigidly discriminating between logical types towards 
an understanding of the progressive interaction between elements, which calls for the 
more mobile and fluid imaginary of set theory. Constrained by the logical limitations 
imposed by Russell's Theory of Logical Types, Bateson is yet drawn to the productive 
nature of mathematical set theory, recognizing that its imaginary and porous brackets 
offer an intriguing contrast to the rigid outlines imposed by psychological framing (Steps 
186).1 3 
The rigidity inherent in psychological framing supports Bateson's contention that 
classification is an arbitrary property of human consciousness, one that exemplifies a 
tendency to abhor abstraction and to prefer discrete difference. In his 1954 essay, "A 
Theory of Play and Fantasy," Bateson provocatively observes that the dreamer and the 
schizophrenic, both exemplars of primary process/unconscious thinking, are "unable to 
discriminate between 'some' and 'all,' and unable to discriminate between 'not all' and 
'none' (Steps 184). The ability to make those distinctions is a product of the conscious 
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distinct outlines that clearly foreground the 'some' within the background of the 'all' 
(Steps 205). In his later essays, Bateson's understanding of the progressive nature of a 
hierarchy of logical types and the need for some semiotic better designed to explore and 
to promote abstractive leaps between them suggests an epistemological move outward, 
beyond the isolating confines of discrete sets of things and towards a more immanent 
space that is indifferent to difference, towards the transcontextual inter-face that he 
proposes as the ecology of mind. Mind becomes, for Bateson, something like a universal 
set, an infinite array of interacting contextual subsets whose boundaries are merely Active 
and within which truth can only be immanent. 
Deleuze and Guattari also reference the human tendency to classify or to segment 
lived experience according to a variety of stratifying differences. Using mathematical 
notation to underscore their seminal metaphor of the Body without Organs, Deleuze and 
Guattari devote an entire plateau to the idea that a multiplicity cannot be constructed by 
the addition or multiplication of single elements; it is, instead, a subtractive movement, 
represented by the formula (n -1), which best articulates the smooth space of generative 
intensity characterized by the multiple, the undifferentiated, a void which is not-empty. 
Here, the mathematical semiotic 1 signifies not a unity but an isolate, not universal 
singularity but the discrete individual. To remove the singular is to w«-delimit, to de­
differentiate. The BwO is a field of pure immanence, a plateau or plane of consistency, a 
"movement of generalized deterritorialization in which each person takes and makes 
what she or he can, according to tastes she or he will have succeeded in abstracting from 
a Se l f (157). The BwO is the set of not-One, and in the fullness of its conjunctive 
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potential, the AND.. .AND.. .AND suggests an exponential recombination, a multiplicity 
of relationships coming-to-be. 
Badiou's use of set theory is paradigmatic. For Badiou, the situation, a circulating 
and repeating series of knowledges, constitutes a local address organized around a void, 
the null set, the uncounted which is yet present in the multiplicity of the situation. 
Enabled by the work of set theorist Paul Cohen to move beyond the limitations that 
Russell's theories imposed on Bateson's work,1 4 Badiou is able to introduce the null set 
as the void present in the situation and as the source of the new, the immanent fount out 
of which the event can initiate the truth-process. Badiou's truth emerges in the situation 
as both singular and generic, universally singular, indifferent to difference, multiple 
rather than unified. 
One of the criticisms leveled against Badiou by his translator, Peter Hallward, is 
that Badiou's use of mathematical set theory equates his concept of situation to that of a 
set, which "ensures that a situation is defined exclusively by what belongs to it (its 
elements, or members), without reference to the constituent relations that might exist 
among these elements," whereas Badiou's definition of the state creates permanent sets 
that are defined exclusively by relations (Translator's Introduction xxxii). Hallward's 
reading is that Badiou is oversimplifying his concept of the situation by failing to 
recognize the presence in any human situation/set of those biological and cultural 
relations that he describes as "universal structuring principles (biological, cognitive, 
l inguis t ic . ) on the one hand, or of certain 'specifying' attributes (based on culture, 
religion, class, gender...) on the other" ("Translator's Introduction" xxxii). The question 
of those relations is, for Badiou, one of recognizing the environment of the situation, if 
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you will. As he indicates in the "Preface to the English Edition," his thought is evolving 
towards recognizing those relations—but this does not suggest that he is embracing the 
limiting descriptors that Hallward advocates. Badiou is emphatic in his emphasis on the 
negative impact of recognizing either universal or specific delimiters that would advance 
the cause of cultural or identitarian classification. For Badiou, set theory is "a subtractive 
ontology: it speaks of beings without reference to their attributes or their identity," an 
assumption that echoes Bateson's perception of sets as constellations of relationships 
between things rather than as collections of things and which correlates to Deleuze and 
Guattari's formula of (n - 1) (Feltham and Clemens 17). 1 5 Badiou is adamant that truth 
admits no exclusion and cannot be founded in it, a fundamental he elaborates in Saint 
Paul: The Foundation of Universalism. While a truth-process is the effect of an event that 
occurs within a concrete and real situation, it is not subject to the conditions or limitations 
inherent in that situation; those relations of difference that Hallward would privilege 
simply do not adhere to the emerging truth of the event for Badiou: 
When one reads Paul, one is stupefied by the paucity of 
traces left in his prose by the era, genres, and 
circumstances. There is in this prose, under the imperative 
of the event, something solid and timeless, something that, 
precisely because it is a question of orienting a thought 
toward the universal in its suddenly emerging singularity, 
but independently of all anecdote, is intelligible to us 
without having to resort to cumbersome historical 
mediations. (Saint Paul 36) 
What Badiou is projecting is that a situation has its own context, its own internal 
relations between its members, which must be revisited in order to determine not the 
differences but the patterns; it is the information that difference yields that allows us to 
locate the larger patterns that emerge within and among the multiples that arise. Bateson 
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returns throughout his lectures and essays to the idea of difference, to the information that 
it conveys and to the contexts within which it functions. In his 1977 Afterword to About 
Bateson, he argues that "a difference is not material and cannot be localized....To locate 
difference, i.e., to delimit the context or interface, would be to posit a world incapable of 
change" (240). 
For both Badiou and for Bateson, the paramount quality of the 
situation/set/context is its potential, not its limit. Bateson reminds us, "It is the context 
which evolves" (Steps 155). Badiou's concept of the void set as existential (that-which-
is) and as immanent within every situation/set/context (and yet as retaining an un-named 
and therefore un-counted and unlabeled property—see indiscernible in Infinite Thought 
24), offers an opportunity for a new discourse on environments and ecosystems. Beyond 
identifying a collection of interacting beings, we can begin to appreciate an ecosystem as 
a set structured or defined by its be-ing, a local relationship with its own immanent truth 
and potential for subject-generation. Place-based sensibilities, long the province of nature 
writers and memoirists, take on a new dimension—biophilia emerges not as an attribute 
or trait but as fidelity to a truth-process which is heralded by some evental counting-for-
one. Such a set defies humanistic or anthropocentric definition or delineation; it is instead 
what Guattari imagines as "an incorporeal ecosystem, whose being is not guaranteed 
from the outside" (Chaosmosis 94). 
Mind 
rhizomes-rhizome 
x e p 
It seems that rigid focusing upon any single set of relata destroys for the artist the more 
profound significance of the work. If the picture were only about sex or only about social 
organization, it would be trivial. It is nontrivial or profound precisely because it is about 
sex and social organization and cremation, and other things. In a word, it is only about 
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relationship and not about any identifiable relata (Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology 
of Mind 151). 
But if mind is immanent not only in those pathways of information which are located 
inside the body but also in external pathways, then death takes on a different aspect. The 
individual nexus of pathways which I call "me" is no longer so precious because that 
nexus is only part of a larger mind (Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind 471). 
If human beings have a destiny, it is rather to escape the face, to dismantle the face and 
facializations, to become imperceptible, to become clandestine, not by returning to 
animality, nor even by returning to the head, but by quite spiritual and special becomings-
animal, by strange true becomings that get past the wall and get out of the black 
holes...(Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus 171). 
One might also put it like this: how will I continue to think? That is, to maintain in the 
singular time of my multiple-being, and with the sole material resources of this being, the 
Immortal that a truth brings into being through me in the composition of a subject (Alain 
Badiou, Ethics 50). 
The whole point is that differences be traversed, conserved and deposed simultaneously, 
somewhere other than in the frozen waters of selfish calculation (Alain Badiou, Ethics 
113). 
For Gregory Bateson, pattern is the essence of theory, relationship is the operating 
principle that governs the ontology of the material world, and the mind is the expression 
of interacting multiplicities across material bodies and beyond temporal and physical 
boundaries. His efforts to revisit and to rethink these truths as they manifest themselves 
in social and environmental issues can be traced to several events: the publication of 
Darwin's Origin of Species, the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, and the 
deployment of nuclear weapons by the United States in World War II. In his introduction 
to Steps to an Ecology of Mind, Bateson indicates his realization that his body of work is 
an effort to propose a new science, one that does not exist; one that would elaborate on 
his studies of a variety of pathologies in one area of knowledge or another and which 
would call forth a new recognition of a phenomenon immanent within them and yet not 
previously counted. Bateson names this metacontext "the ecology of mind," and he 
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proposes that "the mental world—the mind—the world of information processing—is not 
limited by skin" (Steps 460). By linking mind and environment, he expands Darwin's 
focus on the single organism as the unit of survival, recombining elements of the human, 
the other-than-human, the social, cultural, and the biological to envision a situation which 
"expands mind outwards.. .and.. .reduce[s] the scope of the conscious se l f (Steps 467). 
By moving beyond the finite and the concrete, Bateson also redefines survival, noting 
that "the contents of the skin are randomized at death and the pathways within the skin 
are randomized. But the ideas, under further transformation, may go on out in the world 
in books or works of art" (Steps 467). This ongoing vectoring of the ecology of mind is 
the infinite path of truth, along which Bateson recognizes himself as a nomad, a 
wanderer, a set of ideas who is simultaneously unified in himself, bound with others 
whose ideas flow through him, and randomizable, dispersive, to be conjoined with a 
larger flow in a more universal trajectory. What he also valorizes in this new thinking is 
the hope that a certain humility might be introduced into the relationship between man 
and the environment; he cautions that "we are not outside the ecology for which we 
plan—we are always and inevitably a part of it" (Steps 512). 
Deleuze and Guattari invoke not the mind but the rhizome as the metacontext 
within which difference falls away and multiplicity emerges. Disdaining the linear and 
the causal, refusing both the beginning and the end, Deleuze and Guattari find movement 
and potential in the middle, in the undifferentiated liminality of the between. The 
rhizome, like the ecology of mind, is connective and conjunctive. It is made up of 
multiple BwOs, each of which is made up of multiple plateaus. Its linkages are vital and 
organic, not linguistic and semantic, and multiple becomings all move towards dispersion 
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into the multiple: "flows of intensity, their fluids, their fibers, their continuums and 
conjunctions of affects, the wind, fine segmentation, microperceptions, have replaced the 
world of the subject. Becomings, becomings-animal, becomings-molecular, have 
replaced history, individual or general" (162). 
For Badiou, the situation is the metacontext for the truth-process, the presentation 
of multiplicity which arranges itself around the void. The event interrupts the accepted 
knowledge of the situation, a rupture that reveals a new truth that emerges into the 
situation and proceeds into the world as a truth-process. The singular aspect of a truth is 
derived from its emergence out of a situation, a related series of elements related not by 
concrete qualities but rather, as he describes it, by the operation of the situation itself. 
"Every faithful truth-process is an entirely invented immanent break with the situation" 
(Ethics 44). Rachel Carson's Silent Spring, first published in 1962, was an event which 
ruptured the Western world's consciousness of human-natural interaction. Driven by an 
instrumental capitalism which saw the natural world as a wellspring of extractable value, 
there was before 1962 no environmental movement per se. Silent Spring "happened" to 
that stratum of consciousness, allowing the missing sounds of birdsong, eradicated by 
overuse of pesticides to extract record agricultural crops while decimating native avian 
species, to be "counted-as-one," initiating a new perspective which could not be undone 
in a space where it had not been and yet could only be. Among the subjects induced by 
this truth which is consequentially coming-to-be are the contemporary environmental 
movement and a variety of political actions forwarding green issues. 
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{...} = {...} = {...} 
Sometimes if both people are willing to listen carefully, it is possible to do more than 
exchange greetings and good wishes. Even to do more than exchange information. The 
two people may even find out something which neither of them knew before. (Gregory 
Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind 12) 
Don't be one or multiple, be multiplicities! (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus 
24) 
'Keep going!' Continue to be this 'some-one', a human animal among others, which 
nevertheless finds itself seized and displaced by the evental process of a truth. Continue 
to be the active part of that subject of a truth that you have happened to become. (Alain 
Badiou, Ethics 91) 
In Part I of Steps to an Ecology of Mind. Gregory Bateson reprinted seven 
metalogues, fictive conversations which interrogate a thematic subject. As Bateson 
describes a metalogue, it should ideally replicate in its structure the same discursive order 
that the problem under discussion demands. In "Why Do Frenchman?" the problem under 
discussion has to do with the differences between gesture and language, with how 
different things are communicated in different ways, and with the surprising suggestion 
that what is NOT said may perhaps be as important as what is (Steps 11). Gregory 
Bateson has suggested that his ideas might survive his physical death and continue to 
evolve within the cybernetic mind he theorized. Many of his concepts have indeed 
survived him, taken up and elaborated upon, adapted and recombined, or revealed by 
silence, present in their absence, in texts by a multiplicity of authors, among them the 
Frenchmen Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, and Alain Badiou. What does their critical 
gesturing, their eloquent waving, suggest about the survival of ideas and about the 
process of selection that moves some ideas into our active, daily conversation, and 
submerges others under layers of assumption, buried under the rubble of habitual 
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acceptance? If abduction reminds us that patterns of ideas may be mapped across time 
and space, across cultures and disciplines, then recursiveness commissions us to revisit 
our assumptions and to question the survival of some of our oldest ideas. In his first book, 
Bateson wryly observes that during his long tenure as a professor, an annual rumor would 
begin to circulate among his students that "There's something behind what Bateson says, 
but he never says what it is" (Steps xxv). When asked for a draft of what he would like to 
say in a theoretical last lecture, he wrote, "What is form, pattern, purpose, organization, 
and so on...? Those were my questions when I started, and are still my questions" 
(Sacred Unity 307). It is the continuing fidelity to those and many other questions that 
induce the subject of truth that is Bateson AND Deleuze AND Guattari AND Badiou. 
What emerges between them may not be answers, but there is surely meaning. When a 
Frenchman waves his arms, a multiplicity resonates in the cybernetic mind. 
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 Conley offers an in-depth study of the history of post-structuralist environmental thought in France, 
grounded in the structuralism of Claude L6vi-Strauss and progressing through Michel Serres, Prigogine and 
Stengers, Deleuze and Guattari, de Certeau, Cixous and Irigary. With a notable feminist emphasis, her 
discussions of the development of ecological consciousness among the soixante-huitards give enthusiastic 
and perceptive summaries of French theorists, while providing an unfortunately one-dimensional 
discussion of Gregory Bateson's work. Conley's summation of Bateson is drawn entirely from Steps to an 
Ecology of Mind and so fails to appreciate the evolving nuance of his thought, and her connection of 
Bateson to Guattari cites only the overt references, not the more subtle connections between them. Her first 
two chapters offer provocative arguments against the new eco-right neoliberalism of Luc Ferry and an 
interesting oppositional take on Jean Baudrillard's "techno-liberalism." 
2
 The persistence of certain organic images across the text that is Bateson+Deleuze+Guattari is itself 
worthy of a more focused treatment than is warranted in this context. Bateson uses an image of a tree and 
the symmetry between its branches above ground to its roots below as an example of systems and circuits; 
Deleuze and Guattari coin the phrase "arborescence" to describe the linear descent of language systems, a 
filial descent they will discard in favor of the radically unpredictable and nonlinear rhizome. Bateson 
celebrates the co-evolution of grasses, and notes that like a weed, epistemological error will propagate itself 
throughout a system. Bateson argues symmetry using examples drawn from lobsters and orchids, and both 
appear in metaphoric guise in Deleuze and Guattari. Even figures as disparate as wolves and ticks recur in 
both texts, demonstrating not only pattern between but also the creativity and mutability of natural imagery 
in linguistic contexts. 
3
 Guattari notes that he has coined the term "transversality" to stand for his interest not in limiting himself 
to a single area of study or focus but rather to "consider the unconscious elements that secretly animate 
sometimes very heterogeneous specialties" (Chaosophy 8). His use of the term implies something like 
Bateson's notion of abduction, and the ability to recognize patterns that extend across seemingly disparate 
systems also informs Guattari's theories of schizoanalysis. 
4
 Of his lost opportunity to collaborate with Deleuze, Badiou wrote disconsolately of this "amitie 
conflictuelle qui, en un certain sens, n'a jamais eu lieu" in his book, Deleuze, la clameur de l'etre (qtd. in a 
review by Philippe Barbe\ published in the February 1999 issue of The French Review, p.580). 
5
 In his 1967 essay "Cybernetic Explanation," Bateson provides a lengthy and provocative discussion of 
difference, contrast, symmetry, correspondence, and other relational terms which he re-terms as "variables 
of zero dimensions" which are "of zero dimensions and, therefore, are not to be located". The mathematical 
formulation that he resorts to in order to posit the nonquantifiable and therefore nonlocatable nature of 
difference has resonance for Deleuze and Guattari's stipulation that the BwO "is not space, nor is it in a 
space." See Steps to an Ecology of Mind, pp 414-415, and A Thousand Plateaus, p. 153. 
6
 In Ad Infinitum, Brian Rotman also extends Bateson's insistence on hierarchies or levels of difference as 
evidence of the kinds of metacommunication presupposed in his critique of the foundational assumptions 
inherent in Euclidean mathematics. This will be further examined in Part III. 
7
 Recall too Bateson's explanation that meaning can exist only between things; the universe can have no 
meaning, since it is assumed to be all that there is—there can be no other thing between which it and the 
universe can propose meaning. For Badiou, alterity is not a part-word. 
8
 Guattari is also concerned that a re-emergence of an emphasis on sectarian subjectivity rather than a 
diffusion of difference in the consistency of the multiplicity will adversely affect the ecological movement, 
particularly in the wake of the first Gulf War and the attendant surge of neo-liberalism. See Chaosmosis, 
"The Ecosophic Object" and his discussion of the return of nationalism and racism. 
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9
 Badiou's use of the singular 1 stresses neither an originary first person nor even the primacy of an ordinal; 
the universality of 1 is in its equality, in its uniformity of being that admits no fractional identity. 
1 0
 The cautionary note here for the contemporary environmental movement cannot be overlooked. Too 
often, identarian difference becomes the rallying point for an isolating and concretizing identity politics that 
suffocates its own potential within self-drawn boundary lines that exclude creative and collaborative 
opportunities for praxis. I am indebted to Nicholas Russell for pointing me towards Joan Scott's essay, 
"The Evidence of Experience," which clearly notes the consequences of an overly claustrophobic 
commitment to an overcoded singularity rooted solely in difference. 
1 1
 In this sense, Badiou's subject is like Bateson's cybernetic Mind: not bounded by skin. 
1 2
 In Chaosmosis, Guattari notes that "Nothing happens of itself. Everything has to continually begin again 
from zero, at the point of chaosmic emergence," naming the productive potential of the void, of the 
cybernetic chaos that noise represents (94). And note too that in Chaosophy, he makes a very similar move. 
He writes that "I believe that concrete situations always confront us with this kind of moral ambiguity... It 
has nothing to do with the question 'Where are you speaking from?'...but rather 'What is it that begins to 
speak through you in a given situation or context?'" (42). Moving from an indexical query to one that 
interrogates process, Guattari echoes Badiou's notion that an already located subject does not initiate or 
enunciate a truth; rather, a subject is locally convoked by a situational truth-process and emerges in fidelity 
to it. Badiou's theories of the subject, to be further explicated in his forthcoming (and as yet unavailable in 
English translation) Logiques du Monde, represent one of his most radical departures from postmodern 
thought. See Feltham and Clemens' excellent Introduction to Infinite Thought for a brief but useful 
explanation (2-7). 
1 3
 And not coincidentally, Badiou states that "the real terrain for the examination of the relation between 
psychoanalysis and philosophy is found first of all in mathematics" (Infinite Thought 67). 
1 4
 Russell's paradox recognizes that there can be no set which is the set of all sets which are not members 
of themselves, a contradiction which would seem to eliminate the possibility for the emergence of new, and 
previously not "counted," truths. Bateson's positioning of "noise" as the potential source for new 
information anticipates Badiou's introduction of the null set, a concept linked to Cohen's theory of the 
generic set. 
1 5
 Translators Oliver Feltham and Justin Clemens offer an immensely helpful and clear history of the 
development of set theory in their Introduction to Infinite Thought. They also explicate Badiou's use of set 
theory as outlined in his L'Etre et l'ev^nement. They note that the significance of Badiou's claims is not 
that he initiates his philosophy within the domain of set theory, but rather that he identifies set theory as 
ontology. His focus is not on how we know (epistemology) nor on what we know OR on what we are, but 
on being qua being. 
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PART III: THE CHARM AND THE TERROR 
In the inaugural essay of the premiere issue of the journal Environmental 
Communication, scholar Robert Cox proposes that environmental communication ought 
to define itself as a crisis, discipline; he further argues that the consequence of this self-
reflexive move is to reveal a concomitant demand for the acknowledgement of an 
obligatory ethical duty. Drawing on arguments circulating within the emerging field of 
conservation biology, Cox extends Michael Soule's assertion that "ethical norms are a 
genuine part of conservation biology, as they are in all.. .crisis-oriented disciplines" to 
support his own examination of the purpose of the discipline of environmental 
communication, to define that purpose within a context of both urgency and uncertainty, 
framed by crisis, and to impose on the practitioners and proponents of environmental 
communication "a distinctly ethical duty" (6-7). Just as Soule identifies both functional 
and ethical premises for conservation biology, so Cox conflates the terms "crisis 
discipline" and "ethical duty," premising his argument on the assertion that "the hallmark 
of practicing a crisis discipline is the need to make decisions or recommendations with 
imperfect knowledge," and suggesting that the functional postulates of a discipline also 
serve as the originary "basis for the ethical norms for intervention or recommendations 
for managing natural systems" (8). Identifying four basic tenets of the field of 
environmental communication, fundamental meanings or values that he sees constructed 
in the tensions between functional and ethical valences, Cox articulates crisis as nascent 
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in the communicative pathologies that characterize alternative framings of environmental 
events or issues by ideologically "interested" parties (12-13). Cox suggests that these 
principles are not simply the constructive underpinnings of a disciplinary practice—he 
also re-positions these tenets as value-laden normative commitments, as the raw material 
which both constructs and mandates an environmental communication ethic. In another 
articulation, Cox's norms marry crisis reaction/response to democratic process, and 
suggest a heuristic ethic that would encourage opportunities for transparent 
communicative interaction that does not privilege a specific ethical orientation (biocentric 
versus anthropocentric, for example) and which would encourage all parties affected by 
environmental issues to participate in the decision-making process (15). He concludes by 
advocating for environmental communication scholars to speak out publicly when "the 
results of their scholarship point to danger," and to thereby provide critical evaluation of 
discursive practices which might otherwise be "constrained or suborned for harmful or 
unsustainable policies toward human communities and the natural world" (16). Thus for 
Cox, defining environmental communication as a crisis discipline implies a purposive 
and ethical duty to facilitate response to crisis—to actively make recommendations for 
solutions and to enable community decision makers to react appropriately to "signals of 
environmental stress," even in circumstances where systemic knowledge is imperfect or 
incomplete (18). 
How might such a proposal resonate within the cybernetic mind that is Gregory 
Bateson AND Deleuze Guattari AND Alain Badiou? How would the conjunction of a 
crisis discipline and an obligatory ethical response be problematized by each of these 
theorists? Certainly, the idea of a looming ecological crisis, predicated on an urgent need 
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to reevaluate human interaction with the biological world would not be unfamiliar to any 
of these theorists. Bateson frequently expressed concern that human response to a 
widening spiral of environmental degradation linked to human action was perhaps 
already delinquent. In 1970, he wrote that "I do not know how long we have.. .Nobody 
knows how long we have, under the present system, before some disaster strikes us, more 
serious than the destruction of any group of nations" (Steps 468). Felix Guattari, writing 
in The Three Ecologies in 1989, expressed concern that if we continue on our present 
path, "we can unfortunately predict the rise of all kinds of danger: racism, religious 
fanaticism, nationalitary schisms that suddenly flip into reactionary closure" (35). As 
recently as 1998, Badiou cautioned that the political visibility of environmentalists will 
be vitiated as capitalist corporations reductively remodel them as new market targets 
(Ethics 106). However, not one of these writers chooses to advocate a crisis-machine as 
constitutive of some over-arching ethic. Much of their individual rhetoric is concerned 
with communicative pathologies and with identifying the dangers implicit in the failure to 
recognize hegemonic ideologies as they reconstruct themselves in various discourses. 
Each of these contemporary critical thinkers mandates the continued need for 
problematizing the ongoing dialogue in the world, for challenging the discursive 
formations that underlie interactions in the world-that-is. Badiou goes so far as to 
radically critique the humanist ethic that underpins much of contemporary social 
activism. To fully engage Cox's argument and to potentially rearticulate it, it is necessary 
to feed it back through the critical systems of Bateson, Deleuze and Guattari, and Badiou 
in order to recursively test its validity and its weaknesses. 
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Both Gregory Bateson and Alain Badiou identify within the contemporary 
situation the potential for truth and for its distortion or its co-optation. In Part V of Steps 
to an Ecology of Mind (Epistemology and Ecology), Bateson warns repeatedly against 
the unanticipated effects of short-term and purposive thinking, the kinds of 
technologically-assisted decisions that can lead to ecological crises. He argues that 
knowledge frequently utilized becomes reified through the process of habit formation, 
efficiently freeing up conscious mental processes to deal with new ideas, while those 
which are repeatedly used become sedimented and instinctual. The danger that this poses 
for epistemological health is twofold. 
First, such ideas are no longer subjected to rigorous critical inspection, but 
become foundational to other knowledge. Those un-conscious ideas, accepted and 
subsequently unexamined, continue to affect day-to-day actions but are no longer 
consciously perceived as being in play. Bateson observes: 
What is unique from context to context is gong to have to be dealt 
with; what is general from context to context can be handed over to 
what for a moment we will call 'habit'... .We then get the rather 
curious phenomenon that the reasonably lazy mind will economize 
by sinking the more abstract characteristics of situations to 
essentially lower levels which are in general less conscious. 
(Sacred Unity 169) 
In therapy, it is precisely those buried, un-conscious, habitual responses that a 
psychologist labors to restructure; in critical theory, it is those unchallenged fundamental 
(and generally politically and discursively dominant) ideologies which the theorist seeks 
to reexamine. 
Second, Bateson likens the process of habit formation to that of evolutionary 
adaptation. As behavioral and physiological changes become hard-wired into the gene 
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code, flexibility of adaptation is diminished. Bateson refers to this process as one which 
"sometimes works to create evolutionary culs-de-sac," and his meaning should be applied 
not only to human-environmental interaction, but also to contemporary environmental 
discourse as well (Steps 502-510). He points out: 
The moment you have these habit-forming characteristics, which 
are not confined to individual organisms—ecosystems do it, cities 
do it—you have what the computer people called 'hard 
programming': a certain characteristic of the behavior of the 
system is so deeply built into the system that it affects almost 
everything the system does, and nothing short of very violent 
change will change that deep programming. (Sacred Unity 170) 
In Bateson's lexicon, the evolution of an idea from a relatively flexible somatic 
change to the fixity of a hard-wired genetic change conserves the relatively limited 
portion of the human mind available for conscious decision making, but it also constrains 
mental flexibility and occludes critical inspection. The result is an over-reliance on 
purposive thinking that operates on long-held but under-examined foundations. 
Purposive thinking, in Bateson's view, is one of the primary causes of 
environmental degradation in the contemporary era: 
Today the purposes of consciousness are implemented by more 
and more effective machinery, transportation systems, airplanes, 
weaponry, medicine, pesticides, and so forth. Conscious purpose is 
now empowered to upset the balances of the body, of society, and 
of the biological world around us. A pathology—a loss of 
balance—is threatened. (Steps 440) 
Critically, he defines purpose as a short-cut, a self-interested response to any 
circumstance, any communication; purposive thinking is linear rather than circuitous, and 
it fails to perceive the residual consequences of its intervention in a systemic context. 
Bateson was increasingly aware that our tendency to allow purposive consciousness to 
dictate our choice of action and reaction was eliminating flexibility, which he defined as 
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"uncommitted potentiality for change" (Steps 505). Defining our situation in terms of a 
crisis would impose a short-term temporality on that situation and would increase the 
likelihood of the kinds of responses that Bateson considered pathological, the "eating up 
of flexibility in response to stresses of one sort or another" (Steps 505). 
This is precisely the kind of response that philosopher Andrew McLaughlin 
identified as "reactive environmentalism," a crisis response that focuses on the speedy 
rectification of identifiable problems as they manifest themselves, without regard to 
either the social circumstances that contribute to them or to the long-term consequences 
of that intervention (125-132). Drawing on language that is grounded in Bateson's 
emphasis on systemic wisdom and patterns-which-connect, McLaughlin notes that 
reactive environmentalism "assumes that management of problems is possible, which 
leads to calls for technological innovation, more research, and more legislation and 
regulation by the state" (132). What is implicit in his critique is the notion that the 
solution implicit in addressing an environmental symptom as an emergent crisis draws on 
the tools that are ready to hand.. .the same tools used to construct the crisis situation to 
begin with. Robert Cox's argument, while recognizing that dominant discourses are 
constructive of environmental perceptions, does not sufficiently address the limitations 
that a crisis management approach will impose upon an environmental or communicative 
situation. Even more perplexing, any crisis-machine includes in its assumptions the 
notion that there is a solution to every problem, that there is always another chance to 
right what has gone wrong, and that reframing a context is sufficient to renew 
potentiality, even when the conceptual and discursive tools that generate that framing 
remain the same. 
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The idea of a crisis-machine as the discursive framing device of the kind Cox is 
deploying is a notion whose origins may be traced to Deleuze and Guattari's A Thousand 
Plateaus. It emerges at the juncture between their conception of machine/machinic and 
the order-word. They note that "there are no individual statements, only statement-
producing machinic assemblages" and that "assemblages have elements.. .of several 
kinds: human, social, and technical machines" (36). These productive and constitutive 
assemblages of enunciation and ideology exemplify Bateson's notion of recursivity, of 
the viral circulation of ideas in any cybernetic mind, and reiterate McLaughlin's point 
that the tools we choose to solve the problems we delineate are embedded in the very 
contexts within which those problems arise. The crisis-machine that identifies and defines 
an environmental problem as such, and which specifies what may or may not be an 
appropriate response, is the same crisis-machine which also defines and delineates (and 
in so doing, delimits) the solutions to that problem. The crisis-machine produces; it 
manufactures both the crises it proposes and the solutions it proffers. It does so 
proscriptively and prescriptively through the use of order-words, "the variable of 
enunciation that effectuates the condition of possibility of language" (Deleuze and 
Guattari 106). The force of an order-word lies in its concreteness; by over-determining a 
situation through its framing via a crisis-machine, our potential for creative response is 
reduced to a simple binary choice for or against the stated ethic. Order-words untangle 
the alternatives in a given situation and both simplify and speed response; the converse of 
this perspective, however, is that they also limit choices and foreclose creativity. 
There is also the danger here that a crisis-machine will lead to the promotion of a 
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to choose rather than to critique. In decrying the crisis modality, Bateson points out that 
"the terrible thing about such situations is that inevitably they shorten the time span of all 
planning. Emergency is present or only just around the corner; and long-term wisdom 
must therefore be sacrificed to expediency, even though there is a dim awareness that 
expediency will never give a long-term solution" (Steps 442). Guattari proposes his 
ecosophical perspective as an alternative to the blind acceptance of "reductionist, 
stereotypical order-words which only expropriate other more singular problematics and 
lead to the promotion of charismatic leaders" (Three Ecologies 34). In a similar vein, 
Badiou is also concerned with the subversion of the truth-process when it is returned to 
the situation to effect a linear and conscious forcing of new knowledges: 
Only today can we fully assess what this return means: it is 
that of Galilean physics back towards technical machinery, 
or of atomic theory back towards bombs and nuclear power 
plants. The return of disinterested-interest towards brute 
interest, the forcing of knowledges by a few truths. At the 
end of which the human animal has become the absolute 
master of his environment. (Ethics 59) 
In order for truth to become, to be universally singular yet not totalizing, it must 
be the product not of determinism but of chance. True potential (or in Bateson's terms, 
flexibility) exists only when there can be multiple outcomes, multiple actions. Badiou 
locates Evil in the very process of the emergence of Good—in the truth-process itself. 
Evil exists in the same moment as Good; just as the excess of the subject which induces 
the Immortal1 arises out of an utterly disinterested interest (the Good), so the choice to 
pursue self-interest, the inducement of purposive thinking to prioritize subjective goals 
and personal gains, allows the induction of Evil. Badiou is adamant—"it is absolutely 
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the plenitude of the situation and introduces out of the void that which is new, so Evil 
seizes on the plenitude and denies the void, denies the potentiality of that which has not 
yet been counted-as-one and reduces the universal to the singular in a move that is both 
extractive and exploitative. 
Just as Bateson recognizes the potential for harm that denying those other 
perspectives, those other voices, that Other silenced in the situation yet always present in 
the void ("We are learning by bitter experience that the organism which destroys its 
environment destroys i tself Steps 491), Badiou is equally cognizant that it is "for the 
human animal as such, absorbed in the pursuit of his interests" that "a truth [is] absent" 
(Ethics 61). Fidelity demands an unstructured and structuring faithfulness to the emerging 
truth, not a purposive and linear pursuit of specific interests. Borrowing from Spinoza, 
Badiou suggests that "if we define interest as 'perseverance in being' (which is, 
remember, simply to belong to situations of multiplicity...) then we can see that ethical 
consistency manifests itself as disinterested interest" (Ethics 48-49). Perseverance in 
being means perseverance in difference; the movement towards universal singularity is a 
movement out of our insistence on alterity and into a sameness that would belie an 
obligatory ethic that is predicated on a definitional (and therefore differential) 
disciplinarity. 
Robert Cox is not only concerned with identifying the functional and ethical 
tenets that define environmental communication; his stated aim is also to discover a 
disciplinary purpose, to solidify a disciplinary identity that is still in flux. Badiou, 
particularly, is concerned with the dangers of identity politics and the consequences of 
clinging too firmly to that perseverance in being that can be an obdurate adherence to 
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difference. In an interview with his translator, Peter Hallward, Badiou points out that to 
valorize a cultural difference is simply to self-limit; to define oneself as 'black' or as 'an 
environmentalist' or as 'an environmental communicator' is to construct an identity 
based on some externally identified factor or quality and then to reinscribe that difference 
in a more reified manner (Hallward 107-109). Both Gregory Bateson and the 
collaborative team of Deleuze/Guattari describe a similar phenomenon by referencing 
Jakob Von Uexkiill's 1934 study of animal affects and his notion of the Umwelt, 
exemplified in the lifeworld of a tick.2 Deleuze refers to this in his collaborative effort 
with Claire Parnet and again in more elaborate detail in A Thousand Plateaus. Von 
Uexkiill's work focuses on the affective qualities of animals as a means of more 
adequately describing a species, rather than relying on more obvious physical or 
species/genus characteristics. A tick's ethos or niche is wholly contained in terms of three 
affects: it is attracted to light, it is sensitive to smell, and it sustains itself by means of its 
ability to penetrate the skin of a host. For Deleuze, this ethological enumeration of 
affective qualities supplants physical/identarian description as productive of an Ethics: 
that "we know nothing about a body until we know what it can do, in other words, what 
its affects are, how they can or cannot enter into composition with other affects, with the 
affects of another body" (A Thousand Plateaus 257).3 Rephrasing their arguments in the 
language of Cox's essay, Bateson, Deleuze, and Badiou would place the emphasis on 
what environmental communication does rather than on what it is, moving away from 
focusing on terms of distinction and towards terms of process. In this sense, each moves 
away from the conscious and purposive dangers inherent in identity politics and in 
nominal definitions and towards a more radical understanding of a truth that is organic 
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rather than normative. As Bateson so eloquently observed, "What if 'Truth' in some very 
large, and for us, overriding sense is information not about what we perceive.. .but about 
the process of perception?" (Sacred Unity 227). 
In further defining the environmental niche that an Umwelt represents, cognitive 
philosopher Andy Clark notes that Von Uexkiill is describing "effective environments. 
The effective environment is defined by the parameters that matter to an animal with a 
specific lifestyle....It is a natural and challenging extension to wonder whether the 
humanly perceived world is similarly biased and constrained" (25). This is the question 
which Bateson, Deleuze and Guattari, and Badiou are considering when they 
problematize the kinds of definitional certainties that a crisis-machine tends to generate. 
The recognition that environmental communication operates within parameters which are 
socially dictated (and thus potentially both biased and constraining) is reflected in Cox's 
basic functional tenets, and his ethical restatement further notes the need for transparency 
in the expression of those parameters, coupled with the conceptually vague assumption 
that there is an inherent good in those conditions which promote such expression. Like 
Cox, both Bateson and Badiou recognize a need for constant critical reevaluation of the 
rhetoric that moves along and through the trajectory of a truth-process. On more than one 
occasion, Bateson recalls the words of a Japanese Zen Master that "to become 
accustomed to anything is a terrible thing" (Steps 511). In Bateson's terms, recursivity 
forces us to reevaluate the validity of our habitual assumptions, while abductive 
reasoning moves us to think beyond the constraints of a single situation by emphasizing 
recurring patterns through metaphoric investigation. Badiou stresses that "if a truth is 
never communicable as such, it nevertheless implies, at a distance from itself, powerful 
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reshapings of the forms and referents of communication" (Ethics 70). Truth cannot be 
restricted by special interests or by identarian boundaries; in order to maintain 
epistemological and biological flexibility, we must engage in critical inspection as a 
methodology for preventing the reification of truth-process into Truth as a bound and 
finite set, whose constituents are fixed and unchanging. Ethics, like meaning, can 
function only if it is perceived as process, as emerging in relationship rather than either as 
the beginning or as the end of some series of actions or commitments, as immanent 
within a situation rather than as an external bracket that defines it and operates upon it. 
Fundamentally, our most basic notions about alterity and sameness, about the One and 
the 1, and about the finite and infinite boundaries of the ecology of mind must be 
challenged if we are to pursue the faithfulness to a truth-procedure that Badiou advocates 
and that Cox intends. 
In Ad Infinitum: The Ghost in Turing's Machine, mathematician and cultural 
theorist Brian Rotman proposes to examine Euclidean assumptions about number and 
mathematical operations in order to problematize the fundamental underpinnings of those 
assumptions. His questions revolve around our traditional notions of infinity, and he asks 
whether a perpetual and limitless repetition of a series of operations (the unending series 
of additions indicated by the symbolic ellipse ". . .") is either possible or practicable. 
Rotman identifies in mathematics both a Code (the formal language of mathematics, the 
rules, ideograms, operations and other rigorously applied dictum which a disembodied 
and non-indexical Subject employs in the conduct of mathematics) and a metaCode (the 
informal and imaginative linguistic intuition and explication of the Code utilized by the 
flesh and blood Person who communicates the stories that underpin the formal 
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computations) (Ad Infinitum 69-70). Arguing that the concept of infinity relies on the 
presumptive action of a disembodied third actor, a ghostly Agent who can perform an 
endless set of repeated iterations not realizable either by the idealized Subject or the finite 
Person, Rotman raises questions about transcendent assumptions that have material 
consequences for traditional mathematics—and that can be extended to the foundational 
principles that underlie the operation of the crisis-machine. As Rotman points out, 
embodied in "the ad infinitum principle [is] the principle of always-one-more-time," an 
axiomatic guarantee that one can always "ask one more question, carry out one more 
stage of a procedure.. .take another single step forward, count yet again an item" (Ad 
Infinitum 51). The infinite intimates an ever-receding future always-already-waiting 
along an unwavering vector of progress—there is no closure implicit in infinity. Against 
this bountiful iterative infinity (mathematically represented as 0, 1, 2, 3...), Rotman 
proposes a non-Euclidean arithmetic which begins by assuming a finite Agent, one-who-
counts who is constrained by the physical limitations of the material universe within 
which s/he counts, a finite Agent that is, who is actively constrained by the answer to the 
Spinozan question, "What can a body do?" From the assumption of that corporeal and 
finite agent, it is then necessary to "disallow a counting process that was not performable 
within a given level of resource—for example, within the time-span of an individual life 
or by using only so much paper or time or storage facility" (Ad Infinitum 53, emphasis 
added). Semiotically, Rotman imposes the recognition of that limitation, of that fmitude, 
with the notation 0, 1, 2, 3 . . .$, where the $ represents that limit or point beyond which 
iteration is not physically realizable (and by extension, beyond which no more pollution 
can be released into the atmosphere, no more oil-coal-gas can be extracted). Critically, he 
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notes that until the limit is reached, our perception of the integers is unchanged—within 
this range, the numbers themselves behave just as they did in the traditional Euclidean 
perception. In other words, traditional Euclidean axioms hold true locally, within a range 
or situation that has some finite limit (a mathematical Umwelt, an effective environment 
affectively defined and practicably true); what Rotman is interrogating is the all-too-
frequent assumption that what is locally true is also universally valid.. .that what holds 
immanently within an identifiable situation can be transcendently assumed for all (Ad 
Infinitum 117-121). 
Rotman goes on to develop the notion of a series of limitations or exit points that 
emerge as one attempts to identify the finite ranges of a progression of mathematical 
operations in a global context. Moving from addition to multiplication to exponentiation 
to hyperexponentiation, he demonstrates that "an essential feature of the realizable 
iterates.. .is the way their global structure emerges as the result of a reflective or zigzag 
movement" (Ad Infinitum 129). The picture that emerges is suggestive of Bateson's 
discussion in Mind and Nature about the interplay between form and process, between 
calibration and feedback (Mind and Nature 177-189). Bateson intends his ladder-like 
diagram to illustrate the necessary interaction of rigor and imagination, of strict and loose 
thinking, not to advocate what is so often dismissed as relativism but rather to suggest the 
need for recursiveness as an epistemological operation that raises the same questions 
about assuming global warranties from local verities. Each movement up or down the 
ladder represents a step or a range or a situation or a set.. .a set that has as its limit some 
exit point beyond which meaning begins to dissipate, a point where what is locally true 
cannot be presumed to be globally universal.4 In Steps to an Ecology of Mind, Bateson 
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suggested that there is an ecology of bad ideas in the cybernetic mind as well as one of 
right thinking, bad ideas whose pervasive and viral character will proliferate like weeds if 
undetected and unchecked (Steps 492). Recursiveness recognizes not only that choices 
made at some level inform and infuse those decisions which are made at successive 
levels—recursiveness also demands that foundational ideas must be periodically re­
examined, re-engaged to test their viability and vitality—to evaluate their fitness for 
survival. In Western thought, assumptions about Euclidean infinity feed a crisis-machine 
which manifestly assumes its infinite ability to progressively remediate the successive 
consequences of its own decisions.5 Those same assumptions also allow for the presence 
of a transcendent and ghostly Agent who can objectively determine such value-laden 
notions as "appropriate response" and on whom the "obligation to enhance the ability of 
society to respond appropriately to environmental signals" rests (Cox 5). What 
specifically might those environmental signals represent.. .and what dangers exist for 
those who respond to the crisis-machine's injunctions to act or to re-act responsively? To 
restate Robert Cox's concluding question, "What would 'crisis' scholarship and 
education look like for scholars, teachers, and practitioners in environmental 
communication" or in any other discipline which considers itself a crisis discipline? 
We need only look to Gregory Bateson for a question which counters Cox's query 
as follows, "I ask then what is it—what sort of habit of mind is it—that leads to paying 
too much attention to symptoms and too little to system?" (Sacred Unity 296). In an 
article written in 1978, near the end of his life, Bateson raised the issue of what he called 
"symptomophobia" a social trend that responded to symptoms not as indicators of 
underlying systemic problems that warranted careful examination, but as problems, as 
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pathologies themselves which must be "fixed." Occidental culture has become afraid of 
symptoms, so much so that our response is indeed that dictated by the crisis-machine. 
Critically, Bateson notes that our reaction is often to respond to the symptom in such a 
way that we inadvertently enable the underlying pathology: 
We treat the symptoms—we make more roads for.. .more cars, and 
we make more and faster cars for the restless people... We even 
look into the future and try to see the symptoms and discomforts 
coming. We predict the jamming of traffic on the highways and 
invite bids for government contracts to enlarge the roads for cars 
that do not yet exist. In this way, millions of dollars get committed 
to the hypotheses of future increase in pathology. (Sacred Unity 
296) 
He notes that "in biology there are no values which have the characteristic that if 
something is good, then more of that something will be better," a point that seems to 
reflect Rotman's position that beyond certain limits, an infinite expansion of anything is 
not materially defensible. Bateson draws on his earlier work as a psychologist to draw 
parallels between his studies of alcoholism and addictive behavior to present-day 
interactions with the environment. The focus of his 1971 essay, "The Cybernetics of 
'Self: A Theory of Alcoholism," is on the Occidental tendency to conflate the notion of 
the self with some transcendent and autonomous power, the Cartesian Mind which is 
located in and yet in control of the physical Body. In this essay, Bateson carefully 
deconstructs the philosophies of Alcoholics Anonymous using the tenets of cybernetics to 
relocate Mind as an immanent and cybernetic system and to diffuse the notion of some 
external Power; instead, he conflates the aesthetic recognition of systemic holism with 
the revolutionary re-orientation experienced by the alcoholic "hitting bottom" (Steps 331-
332). It is only when the individual organism perceives its own integrity within the 
context of the larger system that true health can be restored; the piecemeal treatment of 
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symptoms will only extend pathology. What is vital is the recognition that "the unit of 
survival—either in ethics or in evolution—is not the organism or the species but the 
largest system or 'power' within which the creature lives. If the creature destroys its 
environment, it destroys i tself (Steps 332). 
Michel Foucault writes that while power circulates, "there is no such entity as 
power, with or without a capital letter; global, massive, or diffused; concentrated or 
distributed. Power exists only as exercised by some on others, only when it is put into 
action" (340). Gregory Bateson was equally distrustful of what he deemed the "myth of 
power," the belief that there is an equivalent to the force or energy that exists in the world 
of physics that can be translated as an equally autonomous and causative power in the 
cybernetic systems of individuals, social constructions, and environmental systems. 
Unfortunately, as he observes, it is an enduring and powerful myth, one that "probably 
most people in this world more or less believe in.. ..It is a myth which, if everybody 
believes in it, becomes to that extent self-validating. But it is still epistemological lunacy 
and leads inevitably to various sorts of disaster" (Steps 494-495). 
It is this hint of an exercise of an autonomous power, one that can isolate and 
address the errors of a system in runaway mode, one that assumes that the external input 
of an outside perspective can successfully target and repair the symptoms of a 
pathological disturbance that Cox's notion of "appropriate response" seems to 
recommend. Bateson would respond assertively that to add input from outside any 
ecological or social or individual system would more likely serve to further the 
assumptions of our technocratic and democratic age, which privilege solution and 
technical know-how with too little regard for the systemic consequences of such ad hoc 
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and mono-perspectival actions. Always cognizant of the recursive nature of man's 
interaction with (and many instances, interference with) the circuitous contexts of the 
environment which defines his existence and his survival in concert with its own, Bateson 
stressed that "the problem of how to transmit our ecological reasoning to those whom we 
wish to influence in what seems to us to be an ecologically 'good' direction is itself an 
ecological problem. We are not outside the ecology for which we plan—we are always 
and inevitably a part of it" (Steps 512). The nature of cybernetic systems is such that 
feedback not only stimulates response in an environment but then itself becomes a vital 
element in that environment and a recipient of the response to its response. In his 
Bateson-inspired study of cybernetics as a key methodology in defining and modeling 
new approaches to the treatment of pathologies emergent in family dynamics, Bradford 
Keeney also references the caveats of acting too purposively or externally on a self-
correcting system. Distinguishing between first and second order cybernetics, Keeney 
follows Bateson in suggesting that to focus treatment on the alleviation of a symptom is 
to identify a part of a system and to assume that it is fully exemplary of the whole system, 
a first-order approach to both cybernetics and to treatment. Higher orders of cybernetics 
demand that partial solutions be acknowledged as such, potentially useful in some short-
term situation, but often counter-productive and even dangerous when introduced into 
what is only a portion of a much more complex whole. He goes on to caution: 
Therapists, therefore, need to ask whether the therapeutic social systems 
that dispense solutions and cures perpetuate problems. Therapists are 
usually not accustomed to thinking beyond immediate pragmatic 
outcomes. Likewise, researchers typically focus on whether the presenting 
problem was solved or, at best, what the success of the solution was.. .All 
of these inquiries examine the effects of the therapist's intervention within 
simple cybernetic process. The effects within higher orders of cybernetic 
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process are usually not approached. It is no trivial matter to ignore higher 
order cybernetics. (121) 
Bateson's characterization of the same process of well-intended yet ad hoc intervention is 
more abrupt: "It is of no use to plead that a particular sin of pollution or exploitation was 
only a little one or that it was unintentional or that it was committed with the best 
intentions. Or that 'If I didn't, somebody else would have.' The processes of ecology are 
not mocked" (Steps 512). 
In their provocative essay, "The Death of Environmentalism," originally 
presented in the October 2004 meeting of the Environmental Grantmakers Association, 
authors Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus offer a passionate argument against the 
traditional methods employed by the environmental movement to advocate legislative 
remedies for environmental problems. Despite its provocative title, the essay is not a call 
for the end of the environmental movement; rather, the authors contend that 
environmentalists need to redefine their issues and to refocus their collective vision in 
order to escape the "literal sclerosis" (9) currently undermining their efforts. 
Shellenberger and Nordhaus interviewed over 25 members of the environmental 
community involved in decision-making, funding, and policy development to arrive at 
their conclusions about the movement as a whole and to determine why the community 
has failed to produce meaningful legislation in the face of the global warming crisis 
facing the world today. Pointing to a failure on the part of the environmental community 
to lead with vision, they introduce a theme that they repeat throughout the essay: that 
environmentalism's "narrow definition of its self-interest leads to a kind of policy 
literalism that undermines its power" (4). Shellenberger and Nordhaus believe that the 
environmental movement has largely defined the "environment" as a nonhuman, separate 
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entity, deserving of preservation and protection, but which has a very specific set of 
"environmental problems" which ought to be the proper concern of environmentalists. 
Noting that "the three-part strategic framework for environmental policy-making hasn't 
changed in 40 years," they use examples from the history of environmental legislative 
proposals to illustrate a familiar pattern that begins by identifying and defining an 
environmental problem, proposing a technical solution, and communicating both problem 
and solution to legislators in some traditional and accepted manner (lobbying, public 
relations, etc.) (6). Repeatedly, the essay points to the failure of environmentalists to 
voice a solution that connects the core concerns of a much wider audience with a vision 
for the future that offers benefits instead of technical remedies. Phrases like "disaster 
preparedness is not an environmental problem"(10), "safety 'is not an environmental 
issue'" (29), and "health care is not an environmental issue" (15) underscore the authors' 
contention that it is with such narrow definitions that environmentalists have distanced 
themselves from the concerns and priorities of an increasingly conservative American 
electorate, and that they are failing to look for larger solutions and for opportunities to 
build alliances with other groups (like labor and civil rights organizations). 
It is that same type of literal sclerosis that plagues Robert Cox's attempts to define 
environmental communication as a discipline and to elaborate for it an overarching and 
comprehensive ethic that would both guide and structure its utilization. In a provocative 
essay entitled "Philosophy and the 'death of communism,'" Alain Badiou asks, "Will the 
evocation of death allow us to find an appropriate way of naming what we have 
witnessed?" (Infinite Thought 95). Does calling for the death of environmentalism 
provide a means for its definition, predicated upon its relegation from present tense to 
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past activity? Or is it more likely that somewhere in the progression from a political 
moving into the linguistic concretism of a movement, from the fluid activism of a verb 
form into the stasis of a nominative category, somewhere in this transition death has 
already occurred? What happens to the practice (and therefore to the praxis) of 
environmentalists' communicating their perseverance-in-doing when it is translated into a 
disciplinary perseverance-in-being? 
In one of his earliest reflections on his anthropological methodology, Gregory 
Bateson shares a charming tale. Describing an oral examination in which he found 
himself compelled to answer a question for which he was ill-prepared, he constructed an 
abstraction to refer to a comparison between two entities that was neither inductive nor 
deductive; in fact, the maneuver he describes is perhaps his first foray into the abductive 
process of reasoning he would later espouse. He describes collaterally how this 
abstractive thinking requires the coinage of terminology to name or describe the 
abstraction he is proposing. He writes that: 
When I am faced with a vague concept and feel that the time is not 
yet ripe to bring that concept into strict expression, I coin some 
loose expression for referring to this concept.. .these brief Anglo-
Saxon terms have for me a definite feeling-tone which reminds me 
all the time that the concepts behind them are vague and await 
analysis. It is a trick like tying a knot in a handkerchief—but has 
the advantage that it still permits me, if I may so express it, to go 
on using the handkerchief for other purposes. I can go on using the 
vague concept in the valuable process of loose thinking—still 
continually reminded that my thoughts are loose. (Steps 83-84) 
Bateson goes on to propose that loose thinking, while conducive to creativity, can only be 
part of any epistemology; what must also be present is a strict thinking that never loses 
sight of the fact that the loose expression is merely a representation of an abstraction. The 
abstraction is not a power or a fact, but rather an idea, a "bit" of information, a difference 
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that makes a difference. Its meaning can only be discerned as it emerges in that liminal 
space within contexts and between other ideas; it is a map rather than a territory, and it 
ought not to be misread as inclusive of all that it conveys. The danger inherent in defining 
(rather than in attempting to describe) environmental communication or 
environmentalism or capitalism or communism is that we tend to accept the term as a 
finite and permanent container for a meaning that is deemed to be complete and static. In 
the act of definition we foreclose; in Bateson's own words, "When you narrow down 
your epistemology and act on the premise 'What interests me is me, or my organization, 
or my species,' you chop off consideration of other loops of the loop structure" (Steps 
492). 
Shellenberger and Nordhaus are not calling for an end to the environmental 
movement; they hope to motivate it to redirect itself so as to end the policy literalism that 
has so reduced its effectiveness. They offer the pointed observation that "the problem, of 
course, isn't just that environmentalism has become a special interest. The problem is that 
all liberal politics have become special interests" (22-23). Badiou would concur, and in 
fact his emphasis on disinterested-interest and the lack of purposive special interest in 
any valid truth-process is implicit in Shellenberger and Nordhaus' call for a 
reinvigoration of the environmental movement that abandons its formulaic response to 
symptoms in favor of a more open-ended and rhizomatic fluidity. Badiou writes that "all 
resistance is a rupture with what is. And every rupture begins, for those engaged in it, 
through a rupture with oneself (Metapolitics 7). In order for environmental 
communication to open itself to the production of truth through the convocation of 
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ethic. No discipline, no political movement, no epistemology can afford either to view 
itself only in part, in isolation, or to assume that symptomatic response at the local level 
will provide an equally sanguine global solution to a systemic problem. Global ethics are 
imposed in a doomed effort to provide transcendent and linear solutions to immanent 
local problems. Environmental communication is not obligated by an ethic nor is it 
empowered to prescribe one; environmental communication is an abstraction, a knot in a 
handkerchief, a description-machine embedded in a situation, faithful to its ruptural event 
and structured by and structuring of the continuation of a truth-process. Robert Cox 
would do well to resist his own impulse to categorize, to name and frame the discipline of 
environmental communication in terms of the crisis-machine, and to overdetermine the 
nature and purpose of its content and its ethic. He should rather heed the advice of 
Gregory Bateson to scientists in search of specific answers to purposive questions: 
[TJrain them to tie knots in their handkerchiefs whenever they 
leave some matter unformulated—to be willing to leave the matter 
so for years, but still leave a warning sign in the very terminology 
they use, such that these terms will forever stand, not as fences 
hiding the unknown from future investigators, but rather as 
signposts which read: "UNEXPLAINED BEYOND THIS 
POINT." (Steps 87). 
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 Recall that Badiou's subject is convened or induced by an on-going fidelity to a truth, a truth which 
emerges out of an event. An event is a rupture in a situation, both immanent within it and yet not 
constrained by the circumstances of that situation; it is more-than and yet always-already-there. In many 
respects, this rupture, which causes the counting-as-one something previously uncounted or 
unacknowledged, is the creative interruption of the void/noise that persists in difference and that yields the 
same, the pattern, the one. To actively challenge habitual knowledge, to cause to be re-examined an idea 
that has been long buried could cause such a rupture. For Badiou, the gathering of a subject ultimately 
produces the Immortal, that which exceeds the human subjects who find themselves convoked by fidelity 
and Subjects to a truth. 
2 1 am particularly indebted to Andy Clark's investigation of cognitive science, Being There, for identifying 
and clarifying Von Uexkiill's work. While Bateson does not identify its source, Deleuze does...but in far 
less detail than Clark's lucent description. 
3
 Bateson utilizes the Von Uexktlll example in Mind and Nature, but he uses the notion of Umwelt to 
support his own arguments about context and its importance, and indeed its necessity, for communicative 
effectiveness. He is particularly interested in how zero communication can in fact be pivotal, and his 
comments here and elsewhere in Steps to an Ecology of Mind resonate nicely with Brian Rotman's treatise 
on zero, Signifying Nothing. For the text of Bateson's discussion of the contextual Umwelt of the tick, see 
p. 43. Deleuze, as noted in the text of this paper, makes a far more useful (for my purposes) argument 
regarding the intersection of Umwelt and ethics. His first mention of this occurs in dialogue with Claire 
Parnet in their 1977 conversations published as Dialogues II. See pp. 60-62 for his elaboration of Umwelt 
and its connection to Spinoza's question, "-What can a body doT—a question which nicely ties his thought 
here to Badiou's use of Spinoza's notion of perseverance in being. 
4
 Deleuze and Guattari describe this point of departure as a line of flight, a point of departure away from 
planes of organization, of stratification and classification, to a plane of consistency, a plane defined by not 
individuality but by haecceity, the Same, the smooth space of the plateau, the Body without Organs. See 
especially pp. 265-272 in A Thousand Plateaus. For Deleuze and Guattari, this is the point of immanence 
and of the emergence of truth process. It is a plane whose "basic chain of expression" is that of indefinite 
article + proper name + infinitive verb, a semiotic freed of normative and relative constraints. The 
indefinite article suggests that what exists is both immanent to the situation and constructed by it: to speak 
of an ethic rather than to propose the ethic recognizes that a universal normative signifier is not possible; 
Sameness arises from within its effective environment and is neither obligatory nor extensive beyond or 
outside it. Proper name does not name an individual subject: it "fundamentally designates something that is 
of the order of the event, of becoming, or of the haecceity." It relates to the rupture that Badiou identifies as 
gathering or convoking a subject, yet still immanent within while not constrained by the situation. Finally, 
the infinitive verb)—always semiotically suggestive of process rather than of form, of what a body is "to 
do" rather than of what it has done. Beyond the point of departure, outside the local Umwelt, we can know 
no-thing; we can only posit an ongoing process whose dimensions and limitations are not materially within 
the province of our physical bodies. 
5
 That machinic processes are not mechanistic must be inserted at this point. Guattari adapted Maturana and 
Varela's notion of the autopoietic machine as descriptive of a living system; he extended their emphasis on 
the "auto-reproductive capacity of a structure or ecosystem" beyond biological systems to social, cognitive, 
and behavioral systems as well. Any system can be characterized as machinic, which implies not a 
metronomic and robotic alternation between variable thresholds, but a productive and generative dynamic 
oscillation between form and process. In Chaosmosis. Guattari fully elaborates his concept of the machine, 
unconsciously (perhaps) reiterating Bateson's zigzag illustration when he asserts that "the machine, every 
species of machine, is always at the junction of the finite and infinite, at this point of negotiation between 
complexity and chaos" (111). A machine, unlike a mechanism, is not set in motion by some external and 
transcendent Maker to infinitely reproduce an identical iteration. Machinism is characterized not by 
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repetition but by process, and it is both productive and reproductive. Much of Deleuze and Guattari's 
emphasis in A Thousand Plateaus is on the war machine and its affects; it is from that concept that the 
notion of a crisis-machine gains its resonance. Every political and intellectual movement can thus be 
envisioned as a machine, just as can any multiply enunciated assemblage or ecosystem. 
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CONCLUSION: SO WHAT? 
In 2004, author Terry Tempest Williams expressed her vision for a new program 
offering a master's degree in environmental humanities at the University of Utah. 
University officials described the intent of the program as designed "to bring the 
perspectives of such disciplines as communications, English, history, linguistics, and 
philosophy to bear on the kinds of environmental issues that have divided communities 
across the country" (Scully B15). Williams suggested that such an inter- and intra-
disciplinary program might "create an ethic of place.. .which can lead to a cultural 
healing" specifically in its home state of Utah, long the scene of cultural, ideological, and 
environmental clashes between persons of different ethnicity, different faiths, and 
different land ethics (Scully B15). In 1979, seriously ill with the cancer that would 
ultimately bring about his death in 1980, Gregory Bateson responded to a request to 
deliver what he would deem to be his "last lecture" with an essay which he began by 
quoting the following lines from T.S. Eliot: "The end of all our exploring will be to arrive 
where we started and know the place for the first time" (Sacred Unity 307). In many 
respects, Gregory Bateson can be thought of as the first environmental humanities 
graduate., .a multidisciplinary scholar whose interests ranged from the natural sciences to 
the social sciences, from mathematics to communication, from psychological systems to 
cybernetics. He was interested in how human beings communicated and how that 
linguistic, digital structure contrasted with the physically embodied and analogous 
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communication between a variety of mammalian species. He examined pathologies of 
communication, of schizophrenia, and of consumption, of alcoholism, and he made leaps 
of abstractive and abductive connection to seek out the illusive patterns that connect one 
seemingly disparate object of study to another. He was by turns an educator and a 
provocateur, always challenging himself and his audience to think again, to be more 
specific, and to problematize and to question, always returning to the place where he 
began to initiate another round of investigation. 
In his Introduction to Mind and Nature, series editor Alfonso Montuori writes that 
"Bateson was engaged in what . . . we might now call transdisciplinary work, whose 
nature it is not merely to cross disciplinary boundaries, but to rearrange our mental 
landscape—to make us see the ecology of ideas and the ecology of mind—to make us see 
anew" (xviii). Gregory Bateson worked to make us "see," not in the traditional sense with 
which we each survey and passively accept the images which our brains transmit to our 
conscious mind, but in a more radical and truly aware sense. Always fascinated with the 
visual experiments of Adelbert Ames, Jr., Bateson often asked his listeners to respond 
with a show of hands if they agreed that they could see him. To the resulting sea of 
upraised hands, he would explain that vision is actually a process; the images which we 
think we "see" are actually the products of an elaborate and unconscious process whereby 
various bits of information, information about differences, are collated by the brain and 
relayed by it as sensory information (Mind and Nature 29, Steps 486-488). Critically for 
Bateson, our willingness to accept the products of process while remaining generally 
unaware of the process which produces them characterizes much of our interaction with 
our environment. Elaborating on this phenomenon in Mind and Nature, he proposes that 
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"image formation is perhaps a convenient or economical method of passing information 
across some sort of interface," a suggestion that relates both to his theories of cybernetic 
mind and to any attempt to locate or to see what an environmental humanities discipline 
might look like (Mind and Nature 34). Bearing in mind the caveats revealed in Part III of 
this thesis with regard to the attempt to overdetermine a disciplinary definition that might 
foreclose creative potential, how might environmental humanities serve as an interface 
between place and ethic, between nature and culture, between human and humankind? 
In another of his favorite metaphors, Bateson would urge his students to observe 
their hands and to re-envision each one not as a palm with five distinctly different and 
functional digits but rather as a collection of relationships, as "a pattern of the 
interlocking of relationships which were the determinants of its growth" (Sacred Unity 
310). How might such a re-imagining recast the notion of environmental humanities not 
as a collection of independent and separately functioning disciplines but rather as a 
collection of relationships, as the product of relationship rather than as a set of discrete 
differences only causally or occasionally connected? How then does the cybernetic Mind 
that is Gregory Bateson AND Gilles Deleuze AND Felix Guattari AND Alain Badiou 
emerge not as a bouquet of unusual and exotic blossoms, held in place momentarily for 
some purposive effect, but rather as one interactive and reproductive system, 
rhizomatically linked not in some ordered and artificial hierarchy but in a far more 
organic felicity? Bateson elaborates: 
Perhaps a curriculum is like a hand in that every piece and 
component of what they would call a curriculum is really related 
ideally to the other components as fingers are related to each other 
and to the whole hand.. .1 am not against the learning of lists. I am 
against the failure to assimilate the components of lists together 
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into a total vision, a total hearing, a total kinesics, perhaps, of the 
wholes with which we deal. (Sacred Unity 311) 
It is the totality of vision that is striking here and that is instructive for environmental 
humanities (and for environmental communication, which is surely one of the "fingers" 
of this particular hand). Gregory Bateson saw in the patterns of his own life the greater 
patterns of systemic wisdom and of epistemological pathology that plague the 
contemporary biosphere. As his daughter Mary Catherine Bateson wrote in her 1999 
Introduction to Steps to an Ecology of Mind, "by giving a portion of his own intellectual 
autobiography, two or three key moments of patterning recognized, he endeavored to lead 
readers along the paths to his own conclusions" (x). His fear of "the monstrous atomistic 
pathology" that spreads virally from individual mind to cybernetic Mind, from obsessive 
self-interest to strident identity politics, from parochial paranoia to nationalistic 
isolationism, is reiterated again and again throughout the course of his body of work. 
Rodney Donaldson writes that "if, as Bateson asserts, all we can know is difference, then 
it becomes at least plausible that the bulk of our personal, interpersonal, international, and 
ecological problems arise ultimately from the simple turning of a distinction into a 
separation, and the separation into an opposition" (xvi). As we have already read, Badiou 
stresses that alterity is what is—that to exist is to exist in difference, and that self-
reflection is "by no means the intuition of a unity but a labyrinth of differentiations" 
(Ethics 25-26). The multiplicity that is environmental humanities has the potential to 
provide a liminal space for the coming-to-be of the Same. In the dynamic interface 
between those poles of difference, between those perseverances-in-being that cling to the 
rigidity of a self that is both individual and individuating, lies the domain of a situation. 
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lies the possibility of the emergence of a truth, one that is, as Badiou insists, "the same 
for air (Ethics 27). 
That the conjunctive synthesis that obtains between the work of Gregory Bateson 
and Deleuze and Guattari is more evident than the abductive leap that locates his thought 
in that of Alain Badiou is undeniable, yet the patterns are still present to those who wish 
to see them. In Badiou's emphasis on the radical nature of the impact of the truth-event 
on its evolving subjects, and in his concept of fidelity as a process, as "a sustained 
investigation of the situation, under the imperative of the event itself," I am attracted to 
the parallels between his thought and that of Gregory Bateson (Ethics 67). In many 
respects, I believe that Bateson's life and work was an ongoing exercise of fidelity to a 
truth-process that only began to be evident to him in his later years. Like Badiou, he 
identified the areas of science, love, politics, and art as potent sets within which subjects 
called by a truth-process might emerge, and he also longed to see a dissipation of the 
discursive and cognitive outlines that delineate the self into the coming to be of a unity 
not unlike Badiou's universal singularity. His recognition of that plateau of continuing 
yet non-escalating intensity that characterized Balinese personal interaction, and that was 
so fruitful for Deleuze and Guattari's Body without Organs, resonates in Badiou's 
description of the ethic of truths as "the principle of consistency of a fidelity to a 
fidelity," a processual consistency Badiou epitomized with the maxim "Keep going!" 
(Ethics 67). Perhaps even more provocatively, Bateson writes convincingly on art's 
metaphoric potential as an interface between the conscious and the unconscious, and as a 
productive space within which a more holistic praxis might be generated as a human 
audience is led to reconnect with the aesthetic patterning that characterizes our systemic 
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integration in the larger cybernetic mind. Bateson argues that "art is a part of man's quest 
for grace," a space which can only be attained if "the reasons of the heart" are "integrated 
with the reasons of reason" (Steps 129). Badiou takes up this same theme in both Saint 
Paul and in interview with Peter Hallward in the Appendix to Ethics, discussing what he 
calls "laicized grace." In the Appendix, he clarifies that "what I call laicized grace 
describes the fact that, in so far as we are given a chance of truth, a chance of being a 
little bit more than living individuals, pursuing our ordinary interests, this chance is 
always given to us through an event" (Ethics 123). It is in the event, in the work of art, in 
the interface that environmental humanities can provide, that we have the advent of a 
truth, the becoming-subject, the abductive leap that carries us out of our singular selves 
and into the plenitude of the Real, into the fullness of the multiplicity, into the power of 
the cybernetic Mind that seems to be me and yet is so much more than I can be. 
Badiou suggests that "a philosophy is also a personal experience," and goes on to 
suggest that in the events of May 1968, so seminal in the lives of a generation of French 
thinkers, that "I was personally marked by this irruption" (Hallward, Appendix 124). This 
sense that something happened is fundamental to Badiou's discussions of the kind of 
rupture that denotes an event, the kind of rupture that propels a truth procedure and that 
fuels the convoking of a subject of that truth process. In the fall of 2006, my own 
particular event occurred. Reading Steps to an Ecology of Mind for the first time, 
something happened—I was personally marked by the experience. Recall that in 
Badiou's philosophy, an event reveals the existence of that which was not previously 
counted; in the rupture that shatters the status quo of the situation, that which was not 
previously heard is now present, and it is the fidelity to that experience that induces the 
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emergence of a new vision, a new perspective which allows the subject to see in a new 
way. It is a fidelity which demands both recursiveness and abduction—fidelity, like 
vision, is a process. Like meaning, it continually emerges in the middle, between what is 
and what comes to be. Gregory Bateson's injunction to his readers is that "the ideas 
which seemed to be me can also become immanent in you. May they survive—if true" 
(Steps 471). My goal is to remain faithful to his immanence. 
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